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REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF
PRIVACY IN BANK RECORDS: A
REAPPRAISAL OF UNITED STATES
v. MILLER AND BANK
DEPOSITOR PRIVACY
RIGHTS
The banking industry today bears little resemblance to that which
serviced customers ten years ago. Increasingly, customers are using such
modern technology as electronic fund transfer systems, outdoor teller
machines, and wire transfers to conduct their financial transactions. In
this time of electronic banking, it is ironic that commercial channels
now carry more customer banking documents than ever before. In
America, "[m]ost of the dollar volume of transactions under $10,000
continues to be generated by check."' One study has estimated that by
1983 customers will be writing 45.8 billion checks a year, nearly a 100%
increase over the 1973 check volume level. 2
As the volume of check usage increases, so does the likelihood that
confrontations will develop between customers, who expect their
financial transactions to be private, and law enforcement officials at-
tempting to gain access to customer bank records. This increasing con-
flict warrants a reassessment of the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Miller,3 where the Court held that bank customers possess no
standing to contest the validity of a government subpoena duces tecum
requesting access to customer records in the bank's possession. Most
commentators on the Miller decision have concluded that the Court in-
correctly applied fourth amendment principles to the standing issue.4
I Electronic Banking, Inc., Checking Account Usage in the United States No. 632-A
Research and Literature Survey xiii (Sept. 1979) (prepared for Bank Administration Insti-
tute, Park Ridge, Illinois).
2 Id at 6.
3 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
4 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.3 (1978); Bazelon, Probing Pivacy, 12 GONZ.
L. REv. 587 (1977); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARv.
L. REv. 489 (1977); Palmer & Palmer, Compling with the Right to FinandalfPiva Act of 1978,
96 BANKING L.J. 196 (1979); Trubow & Hudson, The Right to FinancialPt'va y Act of 1978. New
Protection From FederalIntrusion, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoC. 487 (1979); Comment, Government
Access to Bank Records in the Ajtermath of United States . Miller and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 14
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Additionally, the response to Miller by Congress, state legislatures, and
state courts compels further inquiry as to whether depositors should
have standing to contest government requests for bank documents.
Several factors justify reappraisal of the Miller rule. First, the
Supreme Court inadequately analyzed Miller's constitutional standing
claim. In considering whether the defendant had standing to contest
the seizure of his bank records, the Court ignored valid proprietary and
possessory claims of bank depositors. More importantly, the Court
failed to apply properly the two components of the legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy test first enunciated in Katz v. United States5 to the Miller
facts. This failure denies bank depositors the protection of the fourth
amendment.
Second, congressional legislation enacted in response to the Miller
decision now provides bank customers with privacy protections denied
them by the Supreme Court. By controverting the Miller Court's read-
ing of congressional intent, these statutes undercut the substance of
Miller.
Third, state reaction to the Miller holding indicates dissatisfaction
with the Court's analysis and conclusion. State legislatures statutorily
have conferred standing on depositors to challenge government access
requests. State courts have interpreted their state constitutions as recog-
nizing that bank customers have sufficient legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy to warrant standing to contest document disclosure.
Thus, state courts, state legislatures, and Congress have employed
legislative or judicial means to circumvent Miller. Examination of these
federal and state responses will demonstrate that under the Katz test,
which requires defendants to possess an actual expectation of privacy
that society considers reasonable, bank depositors deserve fourth amend-
ment protection. Since these statutes and court decisions give depositors
actual privacy expectations and indicate that society has determined
these expectations to be reasonable, depositors today possess a privacy
interest protected by the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court
should acknowledge that society today sanctions depositor privacy pro-
Hous. L. REV. 636 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Government Access]; Comment, A Bank Customer
Has No Reasonable Expectation of Privay of Bank Records United States v. Miller, 14 SAN DIEGo L.
REv. 414 (1977) [hereinafter cited as No Expectation]; Note, No Expectation of hivacy in Bank
Records-United States v. Miller, 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 146 (1976); Note, IRS Access to Bank
Records: Proposed Modifications in Administrative Subpoena Procedure, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 247 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as IRS Access]; Note, United States v. Miller: Without a Right to Informational
Privacy, Who Will Watch the Watchers?, 10 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROc. 629 (1977); Note, Is There
a Right to Financial Privacy in Bank Records? Different Answers to the Same Question: Califonia v.
Federal Law, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 378 (1977); Note, IRS Use ofJohn Doe Administrative Sum-
monses, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 465 (1977) [hereinafter cited as IRS Use].
5 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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tection by reevaluating the Miller rationale.6
FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF MILLER
The defendant Miller was charged with conspiring to defraud the
United States government of tax revenues in violation of federal stat-
utes7 after sheriff's deputies, who were investigating a warehouse fire,
found whiskey and a large distillery.8 Government agents thereafter de-
livered a grand jury subpoena duces tecum requesting two bank presi-
dents to appear and produce documents relating to Miller's accounts. 9
Miller was not notified that the subpoenas had been issued. Copies of
his checks were removed from the banks and were introduced at trial,
enabling the government to establish at least three of the overt acts
charged against Miller in furtherance of the conspiracy) 0
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress microfilm
copies of his bank records, and Miller appealed on two grounds. First,
he contended that the provision of the Bank Secrecy Act 1 of 1970 re-
quiring banks to microfilm all checks processed through their channels
constituted a violation of a depositor's fourth amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Second, since the subpoe-
nas were issued by a United States attorney rather than a judge, were
not returned to the court, and were issued for a return date when the
grand jury would not be in session, Miller argued that the subpoenas
were themselves defective. Therefore, since the evidence was obtained
unconstitutionally and by means of illegal subpoenas, Miller contended
that the bank documents should have been inadmissible.
The Fifth Circuit found that Miller's first argument was foreclosed
by the intervening decision in California Bankers Association v. Schultz,' 2 in
which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Bank Se-
crecy Act. However, the Fifth Circuit did agree with Miller's second
contention 3 and therefore excluded the evidence that had been ob-
6 The Supreme Court continues to cite Miller as valid caselaw. See United States v.
Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2444 (1980); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
7 26 U.S.C. §§ 5179, 5205, 5601, etseq. (1976); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
8 United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1974).
9 Id at 756.
10 d
11 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (1976).
12 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
13 United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d at 756. The Court stated:
[I]n view of the long recognized inclusion of private papers and records within the
scope of Fourth Amendment protections, reinforced by the Court's reasoning in Califonia
Bankers, we hold that obtaining copies of Miller's bank checks by means of a faulty
subpoena duces tecum constituted an unlawful invasion of Miller's privacy, and that any
evidence so obtained should have been suppressed.
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tained through use of the invalid subpoenas. The Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that the fourth amendment did not protect Miller's
checks and bank records in the possession of the bank.
Justice Powell, 14 writing for the majority, first found that since
bank documents were business records, individual depositors had no
fourth amendment privacy interest in the documents. Justice Powell
rejected Miller's contention that the photocopying of customer checks
required by the Bank Secrecy Act allowed the government to examine
his bank records without legal process. The Court declined to recognize
that a fourth amendment interest inheres in a bank depositor simply
because of the intervention of the recordkeeping requirements of the
Bank Secrecy Act.1 5
14 It is ironic that Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion in Miller in light of his con-
currence in California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring). In
that opinion Justice Powell stressed that the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act violated
no constitutional protections because their scope was limited by the implementing regula-
tions. Id However, he expressed doubt about the constitutionality of the Act if the scope of
the implementing regulations were expanded:
In . .. [the regulation's reporting requirements] full reach, the reports apparently au-
thorized by the open-ended language of the Act touch upon intimate areas of an individ-
ual's personal affairs .... At some point, governmental intrusion upon these areas
would implicate legitimate expectations of privacy. Moreover, the potential for abuse is
particularly acute where, as here, the legislative scheme permits access to this informa-
tion without invocation of the judicial process. In such instances, the important responsi-
bility for balancing societal and individual interests is left to unreviewed executive
discretion, rather than the scrutiny of a neutral magistrate.
Id at 78-79 (citation omitted).
Justice Powell's fears were realized in Miller. The provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act
allowed the Treasury Department agents to use an invalid subpoena, issued by a United
States attorney, not by a judge, thereby leaving Miller's rights to be safeguarded by "unre-
viewed executive discretion, rather than the scrutiny of a neutral magistrate." California
Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring). This governmental viola-
tion of a depositor's legitimate privacy expectations without compliance with judicial process
seems to be exactly the result Justice Powell was attempting to prevent in California Bankers.
But see Justice Powell's attempt to distinguish his Ca/ifomia Bankers opinion. United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. at 444 n.6.
15 425 U.S. at 441.
The subpoena duces tecum issued to the bank was invalid and therefore had the agents
attempted to obtain the records directly from Miller, they would have been unsuccessful. In
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), the Court addressed the question of whether a
search and seizure of the defendant's personal business records violated the protections guar-
anteed by the fourth and fifth amendments. Id at 465. The Court reasoned that since the
defendant was "not required to aid in the discovery, production, or authentication of incrimi-
nating evidence," id at 474, his fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination had
not been violated. The Court stated that this question had been specifically reserved in
Miller. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. at 471 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at
441 n.3). Thus, a depositor presumably could not today succeed by claiming that his fifth
amendment rights had been violated by a government search of his bank records.
The Andresen Court also held that the defendant's fourth amendment rights had not been
violated because it found the warrant was sufficiently specific in its request and that the
information sought was relevant to the charge being investigated. Id at 480-84. Therefore, it
seems clear that a valid warrant issued to a depositor seeking his financial records would be
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The majority also rejected Miller's contention that Katz v. United
States' 6 warranted the recognition of a depositor's privacy interest. In
Katz, the Court held that a search and seizure becomes unreasonable
when the government's activities violate a person's legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy. Relying on the language in Katz that "[W]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public. . . is not a subject of fourth amend-
ment protection," 17 the Miller majority found that banking records were
exposed to bank employees and therefore were not entitled to fourth
amendment protection.
Focusing upon the expressed purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act to
require records to be maintained for use in criminal, tax, and regulatory
investigations and proceedings, the Miller Court also asserted that the
depositor, when transacting business with banking institutions, takes the
risk that his financial information will thereafter be turned over to gov-
ernment officials. The majority went so far as to say that, even if the
banks were found to be serving their customers in an agency capacity,
no fourth amendment right would be violated when banks conveyed
information requested by subpoena to the government.18
The Court stated that bank disclosure of customer documents was
not uncommon since it long had been settled law that IRS summonses
served upon a third-party bank did not violate any depositor's fourth
amendment rights. Therefore, the Miller majority concluded that "the
issuance of a subpoena to a third party to obtain the records of that
party does not violate the rights of a defendant, even if a criminal prose-
cution is contemplated at the time the subpoena is issued."' 9 Justice
Powell also rejected Miller's contention that judicial scrutiny equivalent
to that required for the issuance of search warrants is necessary when a
subpoena is directed at bank records, saying the existing legal process 20




Justice Brennan dissented from the majority's rejection of Miller's
fourth amendment claim. Quoting extensively from Burrows v. Superior
upheld if it was not "a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings," Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (citations omitted), and if the information sought
was relevant to the criminal investigation.
16 389 U.S. 347.
17 Id at 351.
18 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
19 Id at 444 (citing California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. at 53; Donaldson v.
United States, 400 U.S. 517, 537 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
20 Existing legal process is the requisite standard enunciated by the Court in California
Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, for obtaining records under the Bank Secrecy Act. For
a comparison of different judicial interpretations of the definition of legal process, see note 229
incfa.
21 425 U.S. at 446.
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Court,22 in which the California Supreme Court held that bank deposi-
tors have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank records, Jus-
tice Brennan stated that Burrows was a prime example of "the emerging
trend among high state courts of relying upon state constitutional pro-
tections of individual liberties-protections pervading counterpart pro-
visions of the United States Constitution, but increasingly being ignored
by decisions of this Court. '23
Relying on different grounds, Justice Marshall also dissented. He
succinctly stated that "[b]ecause the recordkeeping requirements of the
[Bank Secrecy] Act order the seizure of customers' bank records without
a warrant and probable cause, I believe the Act is unconstitutional and
that respondent has standing to raise that claim."' 24 Justice Marshall
thus concluded that the government's reliance on the records obtained
under the unconstitutional statute was improper.2 5
FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDING
The Supreme Court has long required a litigant to satisfy standing
requirements26 before he is able to contest searches of his property or
22 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974). Because it found that deposi-
tors possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank records, the Burrows court held
that the search was unreasonable and therefore in violation of the California Constitution.
23 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 454-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
24 Id at 456 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25 Id Justice Brennan also stated that the reporting and recordkeeping requirements of
the Bank Secrecy Act were unconstitutional. Id at 452 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. at 91 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
26 The Court has defined standing as the requirement that "a party ha[ve] a sufficient
stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy."
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). For general purposes, there are three basic
requirements for standing. First, the party must suffer an injury in fact-a concrete or factual
injury. Second, the litigant must show that the challenged governmental action caused his
injury. Third, the party must demonstrate a "logical nexus between the status asserted and
the claim sought to be adjudicated." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968). See generally L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-17 to -23 (1978).
The standing inquiry under the fourth amendment differs somewhat from that utilized
for other constitutional questions. See generall Trager & Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing Under
the Fourth Amendment, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 421 (1975); White & Greenspan, Standing to Object
to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 333 (1970). See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974). In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the
Court reiterated that a litigant must allege injury in fact and must assert his own rights and
not those of a third party. Id at 139-40 (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
152-53 (1970)). Justice Rehnquist stated his discomfort, though, with retaining the standing
and fourth amendment questions as separate analytical inquiries: "But this Court's long his-
tory of insistence that fourth amendment rights are personal in nature has already answered
many of these traditional standing inquiries, and we think that definition of those rights is
more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within
that of standing." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 140.
The Court established a two-fold standing inquiry: whether the search or seizure vio-
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possessions. The Court has found that a defendant's "proprietary or
possessory interest in the premises" 27 or his property interest in the item
seized confers standing upon the defendant. 28 Although it has dis-
avowed strict adherence to these proprietary standing determinants,2 9
the Court has normally accorded standing to a defendant who does
show such an interest.30
The Court radically departed from reliance on these proprietary
determinants in Katz v. United States.31 In Katz, the government elec-
tronically eavesdropped, without a warrant, on the defendant's conver-
sation in a public phone booth. Agreeing that "'[t]he premise that
property interests control the right of the Government to search and
seizure has been discredited,' "32 the Court developed the expectation of
privacy doctrine as a vehicle for circumventing the unduly restrictive
ownership and possession requirements necessary to establish a protect-
able fourth amendment interest. Since the defendant neither owned the
lated the fourth amendment rights of the person seeking to exclude evidence and whether the
search violated an interest that the fourth amendment seeks to protect. Id While the Court
acknowledged that this transfiguration of traditional standing analysis would not in the fu-
ture simplify its inquiry, it concluded that subsuming standing under the fourth amendment
ensures that "the decision of this issue will rest on sounder logical footing." Id
27 Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973).
28 Proprietary and possessory interests are traditional standing determinants. See, e.g., Ed-
wards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonabv SeizedEvidence, 47 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 471 (1952). A propri-
etary interest is essentially a property interest in the seized items or area searched.
One characteristic of ownership is the right to exclude others, and "one who owns or
lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of
privacy by virtue of this right to exclude." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12 (citing 2 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *ch. 1). Therefore, if a defendant claims ownership of the
seized item or area searched, he will likely be entitled to contest a violation of his fourth
amendment rights. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54 (1951). But see Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2561 (1980) ("Petitioner contends. . . because he claimed owner-
ship of the drugs, he should be entitled to challenge the search regardless of his expectation of
privacy. We do not agree."). However, "[w]hile property ownership is clearly a factor to be
considered in determining whether an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have been vio-
lated, . . . property rights are neither the beginning nor the end of this Court's inquiry."
United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 2553 (1980). The Court in Salvuci held that the
owner of the item in addition must demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
area searched. Id.
An alternative standing basis is the defendant's legal possession of the item without also
having an ownership interest. However, like the proprietary determinant, possession of the
seized item may not ensure standing for the defendant: "The person in legal possession of a
good seized during an illegal search has not necessarily been subject to a Fourth Amendment
deprivation." Id. at 2552.
29 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143 ("[W]e adhere to the view expressed in jones and
echoed in later cases that arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law. . . ought
not to control.') See also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2556; United States v. Salvucci,
100 S. Ct. 2547.
30 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 4, at 565.
31 389 U.S. 347.
32 Id at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)).
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phone nor claimed possessory rights, the Court could not utilize the pro-
prietary or possessory interest tests to protect the defendant. Therefore,
the Court focused upon the privacy expectation of the defendant to de-
termine a fourth amendment violation.
Because the Court relied upon neither a property nor a possessory
interest in holding that the fourth amendment protected the defendant,
commentators generally have applauded the Katz reasoning.33 Most
writers predicted that Katz would serve as the genesis for a more expan-
sive reading of the fourth amendment. However, the Supreme Court
has never interpreted Katz as a radical expansion of the fourth amend-
ment.
While the Court continues to rely upon the legitimate expectation
of privacy concept, such reliance has not broadened the class or number
of litigants protected by the fourth amendment. The Court first re-
stricted the fourth amendment's scope in Rakas v. Ilinois,34 where it
modified the standing inquiry by asking "whether it serves any useful
analytical purpose to consider this principle a matter of standing, dis-
tinct from the merits of the defendant's Fourth Amendment claim."'35
Reiterating that fourth amendment rights are personal, the Court con-
cluded that "the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a
particular defendant's rights under the fourth amendment, rather than
on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of
standing."'36 Thus, Rakas modified Katz by asking not only whether the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental
intrusion, but also whether that defendant's fourth amendment rights
were violated. Therefore, while asserting that Katz "provides guidance
in defining the scope of the interest protected by the Fourth Amend-
33 See Amsterdam, supra note 26; Dutile, Some Observations on the Supreme Court's Use of Prop-
erty Concepts in Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1971); Comment,
Government Access to Bank Record, 83 YALE L.J. 1439, 1459-65 (1974); Note, The Reasonable
Expectation ofPrivag--Katz v. U.S-A Postscn'btum, 9 IND. L. REv. 468 (1976); Note, A Reconsid-
eration of the Katz Expectation of Pn'va Test, 76 MICH. L. REv. 154 (1977) [hereinafter cited as A
Reconsideration]; Note, From Private Places to Personal Privaq: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amend-
ment Protections, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 968 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Post-Katz Study].
34 439 U.S. 128. In Rakas, the petitioners were convicted of armed robbery. The prosecu-
tion introduced into evidence a rifle and shells found in the car in which the petitioners were
riding. The Illinois Appellate Court held that the petitioners, who neither owned the car nor
asserted ownership of the rifle and shells, lacked the requisite standing to contest the search of
the automobile and the seizure of the evidence. In upholding the Illinois Appellate Court's
decision, the Court held that the petitioners' standing claim failed because "[t]hey asserted
neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interest in the property
seized." Id at 148. For a detailed discussion of Rakas, see Note, Fourth Amendment-Reasonable
Expectations oftiva, in Automobile Searches, 70 J. CRIM. L. & C. 498 (1979).
35 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 138-39.
36 Id at 139.
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ment, ' 37 the Rakas Court relied upon the absence of the defendants'
property or possessory interests to deny their standing claims. 38
The Court has continued its restrictive interpretation of the Katz
expectation of privacy test in its two most recent standing decisions,
Rawlings v. Kentucky 39 and United States v. Salvucci.40 In Rawi'ngs, the de-
fendant had been convicted of possession with intent to sell various con-
trolled substances. 4' Honoring Katz-s declaration that "arcane
distinctions developed in property. . . law. . . ought not to control," 42
the Court rejected the petitioner's assertion that mere ownership of the
seized goods was sufficient to raise fourth amendment rights, 43 but ac-
knowledged that ownership was a factor in answering the ultimate in-
quiry "whether government officials violated any legitimate expectation
of privacy held by petitioner."44
In a dissent joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall criticized
the Court for focusing solely upon the defendant's privacy interest in the
searched items. Citing the historical underpinnings of the fourth
amendment as authority, Justice Marshall asserted that a property in-
terest in the seized items is sufficient to confer standing to contest their
seizure.45 Thus, either a property interest in the items seized or a pri-
vacy interest in the premises searched should satisfy the fourth amend-
ment standing requirement.
Implicitly rejecting Justice Marshall's thesis that ownership should
confer standing upon a defendant, the Court in United States v. Savucci4 6
37 Id at 143.
38 Id at 148.
39 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980). The case is examined in Note, Fourth Amendment-The Court
Further Limits Standing, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 567 (1980).
40 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980). See Note, supra note 39.
41 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. at 2561. Petitioner Rawlings was a house guest and
placed the illegal drugs in the purse of another guest immediately before the police entered
the house. Justice Rehnquist noted that the petitioner had known the holder of the drugs
only for several days, had no power to exclude others from the purse and had not taken
precautions designed to protect any privacy interest he might have possessed in the area
searched. Id
42 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 149-50 n.17.
43 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. at 2562.
44Id
45 Id at 2568.
46 100 S. Ct. 2547. The Court in Salvuci overturned the rule first enunciated in Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), that defendants charged with crimes of possession had
"automatic standing" to contest the search and seizure.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, concluded that the reasons underlying the
"automatic standing" rule were no longer tenable. The first reason supporting the establish-
ment of the automatic standing rule is that a defendant was required to allege ownership of
the seized goods to possess standing to contest their illegal seizure. However, at trial the
defendant had to deny ownership of the goods in order to avoid conviction for the possessory
crime. Automatic standing eliminated the need for the defendants to allege ownership to
1981]
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stated that "property rights are neither the beginning nor the end of the
Court's inquiry. '4 7 While recognizing that legal possession of the seized
good may in some circumstances entitle the defendant to fourth amend-
ment protection, the Court held that the defendant must still demon-
strate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Thus,
Sa/vucci fashioned a two-pronged inquiry "by asking not merely whether
the defendant had a possessory interest in the items seized, but whether
he had an expectation of privacy in the area searched. '4 8 Although
Katz "purported to clean house on outmoded fourth amendment princi-
ples,' 4 9 both Savucci and Rawlings relied upon Katzs rejection of prop-
erty concepts to support denial of standing to defendants who would
have had standing under the traditional proprietary determinants.
Both Courts examined the defendant's possessory and proprietary
claims and emphasized the lack of such interests as support for their
conclusion that the defendants possessed no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the area searched. Thus, the Court has relied upon property
concepts supposedly rejected in Katz to narrow the applicability of the
Katz expectation of privacy test.
While possessory or property interests still play some role, the
fourth amendment today primarily focuses on whether a depositor has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Since many fac-
tors which determine the legitimacy of a defendant's standing claim
have been enunciated by the Court subsequent to its Miller decision, the
Miller Court's analysis is less viable today in light of the development of
fourth amendment caselaw. Yet, even those factors cited by the Miller
Court to justify its denial of depositor standing are unsound. Thus, it is
attain the requisite standing. Second, the government's position regarding the admissibility
of the seized evidence was also inconsistent since the government had to assert that the de-
fendant possessed the goods for purposes of criminal liability, but did not possess them for the
purposes of fourth amendment standing.
The Salvucci Court stated that more recent caselaw and changing circumstances have
rendered these justifications invalid. In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the
Court held that testimony offered by a defendant in support of his motion to suppress cannot
later be used against him for purposes of proving criminal liability. Thus, the majority ob-
served that the Simmons rule obviated the need for theJones rule because "Simmons . . . not
only extends protection against this risk of self-incrimination in all of the cases covered by
Jones, but also grants a form of 'use' immunity to those defendants charged with nonposses-
sory crimes. In this respect, the protection of Simmons is therefore broader than that ofJones."
United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. at 2553.
The majority stated that the secondJones justification similarly was antiquated because
subsequent decisions have established "[t]hat a prosecutor may simultaneously maintain that
a defendant criminally possessed the seized good, but was not subject to a Fourth Amend-
ment deprivation, without legal contradiction." United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. at 2552.
47 100 S. Ct. at 2553.
48 Id
49 Note, Post-Katz Study, supra note 33, at 975.
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appropriate to analyze the arguments raised by the Miller Court to jus-
tify its conclusion. Thereafter the merits of a bank customer evidentiary
privilege will be examined. Finally, the additional indicia of a legiti-
mate fourth amendment privacy expectation explicated in Rakas will be
applied to the Miller facts. Both the examination of the Miller Court's
reasoning and the fourth amendment determinants established subse-
quent to Miller will demonstrate that depositors do possess a legitimate
expectation of privacy in their bank records.
ANALYSIS OF MILLER
The Miller Court raised five reasons for refusing to acknowledge
any legitimate expectation of depositor privacy. First, the Court charac-
terized checks as negotiable instruments and not as confidential commu-
nications. 50 While checks are negotiable instruments, the asserted
depositor privacy interest derives not from the check as an instrument,
but from the information which the check conveys.5' While the Miller
Court ignored the privacy of check information, previous Court deci-
sions have more flexibly interpreted defendant privacy expectations.
In Mancusi v. DeForte,52 district attorneys charged a union official
with conspiracy and extortion and searched his office desk without a
warrant. The Court looked beyond the communal office area and held
that DeForte could legitimately expect no one to obtain his records from
the office without his permission or without a lawful warrant. Similarly,
a depositor legitimately expects no one but bank employees to view
records of his banking transactions unless authorized by lawful means or
by his authority.53 Thus, the Miller Court erroneously emphasized the
function of the defendant's check and ignored its earlier admonition in
Mancusi "that capacity to claim the protection of the [Fourth] Amend-
ment depends not on a property right. . . but upon whether the area
was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion. '54 A check is'not just commercial paper, but
50 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
51 "In a sense, a person is defined by the check he writes. By examining them, the agents
get to know his doctors, lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connections, religious affilia-
tion, educational interests, the papers and magazines he reads, and so on adinfmiun." Cali-
fornia Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. at 85 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Note, IRS
Access, supra note 4, at 249; Note, IRS Use, supra note 4, at 471. For a discussion of check
information constituting a property interest, see notes 130-33 & accompanying text infa.
52 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
53 Justice Marshall has articulated this distinction: "Privacy is not a discrete commodity,
possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone com-
pany for a limited business purpose need not assume that this information will be released to
other persons for other purposes." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
54 392 U.S. at 368.
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"provides a virtual current biography" 55 of the life of the bank customer
and therefore legitimately warrants privacy protection.
The Miller Court further buttressed its denial of standing by em-
phasizing that Miller had voluntarily made public his banking informa-
tion by placing his checks in commercial channels. While this may be
technically accurate, financial reality contradicts the Court's finding of
voluntariness: "For all practical purposes, the disclosure by individuals
or business firms of their financial affairs to a bank is not entirely voli-
tional, since it is impossible to participate in economic life of contempo-
rary society without maintaining a bank account. ' 56 Commentators
have also questioned the validity of the Court's characterization that
checking account usage is a purely voluntary act, 57 especially when it is
estimated that over 80% of American families maintain a checking ac-
count.
5 8
55 Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 244, 247, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172, 529 P.2d 590,
596 (1974).
56 Id
57 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 415; Comment, Govermnent Access, supra note 4, at
644 n.64; Comment, No Expectation, supra note 4, at 431.
58 A 1977 study conducted by the Federal Reserve Board estimated that 81.4% of families
in 1977 had a checking account. T. Durkin & G. Elliehausen, 1977 Consumer Credit Survey
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1978), cited in Electronic Banking, Inc.,
supra note 1, at 12-14. While this figure is supported by a 1978 report that 80.8% of U.S.
households had a checking account and 90.9% used at least one service at a financial institu-
tion, see Payment Systems, Inc. & Darden Research Corp., Payment Systems Perspectives '78
(1978), cited in Electronic Banking, Inc., supra note 1, at 14, several other studies conducted by
telephone indicated the figure may be even higher. In 1974, a survey of 1,724 households
found 92% of the respondents maintained a checking account. Unidex, The Unidex Report:
Checking (Sept. 1974), citedin Electronic Banking, Inc., supra note 1, at 12. A similar study in
1977 of 2,012 households indicated that 93% of the respondents maintained a checking ac-
count. Unidex, The Unidex Report: Customer Service Usage-Part I 1 (May 1977), cited in
Electronic Banking, Inc., supra note 1, at 12-14.
These studies demonstrate that checking accounts are widely used and relied upon by
consumers to conduct their financial transactions. The minority of Americans who do not use
checking accounts fall into four categories: indigents, people oriented to their local neighbor-
hoods who have incomes in the $3,000-5,000 range, skilled and unskilled workers earning
$7,000-15,000, and well educated and high income individuals who choose for lifestyle rea-
sons not to use financial services offered by banks. R. SCHLAX & S. LEvY, A QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS OF WHY PEOPLE Do NOT HAVE CHECKING AccouNTs, (Bank Marketing Ass'n
1971), ciledin Electronic Banking, Inc., supra note 1, at 35, 37. Among the major reasons cited
for customer avoidance of checking accounts were: use of a checking account would change
their money management habits, would take away their tangible reward for work, would
reduce their feeling of financial control over their own affairs, would be too difficult to learn
how to use, and would not be worth the trouble for their own small amounts of money. Id
While these figures indicate that not all Americans have a checking account, they also
establish that a majority of Americans do maintain checking accounts. Furthermore, the
studies indicate that those who do not maintain checking accounts are not average consum-
ers--they tend to be poor, to restrict their movement to within the confines of their own
neighborhood, to fear the perceived complexity of using a checking account or to refrain on
principle from using banking services at all. The high percentage of use of checking accounts
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As support for its conclusion that depositors lose privacy protection
when using commercial channels, the Miller court cited language from
Katz v. United States5 9 that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. '60 In
Katz, the Court held that governmental tapping of the defendant's
phone call in a public telephone booth violated his legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy. Reliance by Miller on the Katz language proves too
much. When Katz made his phone call, he spoke over a telephone com-
pany system which is a publicly-used communication medium. While
voluntarily using a telephone to convey his information, his expectation
was that the information would be transmitted neutrally to its intended
destination. Miller similarly used his bank as a financial medium, with
the corollary expectation that the bank without interruption would
complete the requirements of the transaction. Thus, while both Katz
and Miller voluntarily chose public communication vehicles, they did
not intend government agents to intercept the information.
As a third basis for denying standing to Miller, the Court further
relied upon this notion of voluntariness in stating that the depositor as-
sumes the risk that information conveyed to a bank will be turned over
to government officials.61 In Smith v. Mayland,62 Justice Marshall ex-
posed the fallacy of this risk analysis. In Smith, the Court held that a
caller has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers
that he dials, and the government's use of a pen register6 3 did not consti-
is not conclusive proof that consumers are compelled to use them by the demands of today's
financial world. These studies establish that an overwhelming majority of Americans main-
tain checking accounts, and that those who do not use them do so primarily because they do
not understand how they work or because they do not have sufficient financial resources to
make their use practical. Thus, for most Americans "the personal checking account is an
integral part of a consumer's way of life. . . . The check is the primary means by which
consumers pay their bills and manage their financial affairs." Electronic Checking, Inc., supra
note 1, at 137.
59 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351.
60 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at
351).
61 425 U.S. at 443. The flaw in this component of the Court's analysis is that while each
defendant voluntarily used certain public means, they in no way voluntarily made what they
conveyed by these means public. Katz intended and reasonably expected the information
solely to reach the person he called. Miller intended and reasonably expected the check to be
processed and thereafter sent back to him. Therefore, neither of these defendants assumed
the risk that the information would fall into government hands.
62 442 U.S. 735 (1979). For a thorough discussion of Smith v. Magland, see Note, Fourth
Amendment-Pen Register Surveillance, 70 J. CRIM. L. & C. 433 (1979).
63 "A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a tele-
phone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is
released. It does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls
are actually completed." A pen register is "usually installed at a central telephone facil-




tute a search in violation of the fourth amendment. Criticizing the ma-
jority's assumption that the caller assumed the risk of financial record
disclosure, Justice Marshall reasoned that "[i]mplicit in the concept of
assumption of risk is some notion of choice. . . . [U]nless a person is
prepared to forego use of what for many has become a personal or pro-
fessional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance. It
is idle to speak of 'assuming' risks in contexts where, as a practical mat-
ter, individuals have no realistic alternative. '64
As with phone services, banking services are indispensable in to-
day's society. In light of the overwhelming majority of citizens who
have bank accounts, reliance upon risk analysis to deny bank depositors
fourth amendment protection is unsound. For "whether privacy expec-
tations are legitimate. . . depends not on the risks an individual can be
presumed to expect when imparting information to third parties, but on
the risks he should be forced to assume in a free and open society."'65
Depositors should not be forced to assume the risk of record disclosure
because the danger in using risk analysis is its unlimited scope. Only a
narrow assumption of risk exception to fourth amendment coverage will
adequately protect defendants in phone booths, office areas, and com-
mon areas of dwellings.
The Court derived its fourth basis for denying standing from the
legislative history of the Bank Secrecy Act. 66 The purpose of the Act,
the Court stated, was to require the keeping of records because of their
value in "criminal, tax and regulatory investigations and proceed-
ings."'67 Indeed, in examining the legislative history of the Bank Secrecy
Act, the Court reiterated its conclusions in Califomia Bankers Association v.
Schultz.68 In that case the Court set forth two problems which moti-
442 U.S. at 736 n.1 (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1
(1977); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.1 (1974)).
64 442 U.S. at 749-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65 Id at 750. Therefore, neither of these defendants assumed the risk that the information
would reach government hands.
66 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43.
67 Id at 443 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1)). Subsequent legislation has undercut this
expansive reading of the purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act. The Right to Financial Privacy
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, §§ 1100-22, 92 Stat. 3697-710 (1978) (codified as 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3401-22 (Supps. III & IV 1979-80)), was enacted partially in response to congressional
disapproval of the Court's interpretation of the purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act. The Miller
Court stated that Congress intended to deny customers any legitimate privacy interest in their
bank records. Congress responded by legislatively mandating all the protection a customer
would have received if the Court had found Miller warranting fourth amendment protection.
Customers today under federal law are granted a reasonable expectation that their records
will not be divulged unless legal process is employed and the customer is given adequate
notice of the access request. For a thorough discussion of the provisions of the Right to Finan-
cial Privacy Act of 1978, see notes 174-80 & accompanying text inra.
68 416 U.S. 21.
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vated Congress to pass the Bank Secrecy Act: the need to ensure that
banks maintain adequate records of the financial transactions of their
customers and the need to curtail the use by customers of "foreign
financial institutions, located in jurisdictions with strict laws of secrecy
as to bank activity, for the purpose of violating or evading domestic
criminal, tax and regulatory enactments. '69 The intent of the Act,
therefore, was to preclude customers from using their banking in-
termediaries to facilitate covert financial transactions.
This purpose is distinguishable from the widespread examination of
customer records authorized by the M'ller Court. The typical bank cus-
tomer has no deceptive intention when conducting his banking business.
Even Miller, who was engaged in an illegal distillery operation, was not
disguising his operations through his commercial transactions. While
Miller was convicted of defrauding the government of tax revenues, his
use of his bank account to purchase the distillery parts was not an ele-
ment of the offense. Miller could have avoided use of the bank by pay-
ing cash for the parts. However, the intent of the Bank Secrecy Act is to
uncover crimes such as sheltering unreported taxable income in foreign
banks where the defendant's use of the banking facilities is integral to
the commission of the crime. Without the use of a bank, large sums of
money cannot be disguised, either profitably or practically. Because
Miller's banking transactions were not integral to the tax fraud charge,
the purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act to uncover fraud perpetrated by
means of banking is not germane in the Miller context. Thus, the Miller
Court's broad reading of the purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act is inap-
propriate when applied to common consumer transactions.
The fifth basis for questioning the Miller Court's denial of depositor
standing is its reliance on the "false friend" cases: Hoffa v. UnitedStates,70
Lopez v. United States,71 and United States v. White.72 The Court cited
these cases for the proposition that the fourth amendment will not pro-
tect "information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the as-
sumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confi-
dence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. '73
The Court's reliance upon this judicial trilogy has been criticized in
two respects. 74 First, the Hofa case emphasizes that when one volunta-
rily discusses his wrongful actions with another, the fourth amendment
69 Id at 27.
70 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
71 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
72 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
73 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
74 I W. LAFAvE, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 415.
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is not available to protect him against later ramifications of his disclo-
sures. As noted above, however, 75 an individual does not exercise the
same degree of voluntariness over the decision to use a banking system
as a person uses in choosing to whom to speak:
Even if it may be said that the risk which Hoffa took 'is the kind of risk we
necessarily assume whenever we speak,' it by no means follows that the
Fourth Amendment likewise leaves the potential bank customer with 'the
unsavory dilemma of either not using the banking system or using it and
waiving his protectable privacy interest.' 76
Furthermore, the information voluntarily given up by the false
friend defendants is distinguishable from that given up by bank custom-
ers. In making statements in the presence of a friend, Hoffa was fully
aware of the incriminating nature of the information he was divulging.
However, an analogy to Miller cannot fairly be drawn. In writing
checks paid by his bank, Miller was not cognizant of the incriminating
nature of the information contained on the checks even if he was aware
that such bank information might be made public. In fact, bank record
information alone rarely is incriminating so the bank customer cannot
be said to waive his privacy interest if he is unaware of the relevance and
the significance the information will later possess. The differences in the
degree to which disclosure of the information is truly voluntary and to
which the defendants comprehend the disclosed information's incrimi-
nating potential render the Miller Court's reliance on the false friend
cases unwarranted.77
The five bases advanced by the Court for refusing to acknowledge
customer standing are unpersuasive. Thus, the Court's reasoning does
not fairly support its denial of Miller's constitutional claims. Perhaps
anticipating such a constitutional result, Miller further asserted that his
bank information was protected by a bank-customer evidentiary privi-
lege.
A. BANK-CUSTOMER EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE
In denying Miller's constitutional argument, the Court disregarded
his assertion that his documents were protected by a bank-customer evi-
dentiary privilege, 78 by expressly refusing to consider the question of evi-
dentiary privileges. 79 Nevertheless, judicial creation of a bank-customer
evidentiary privilege may be a viable means of protecting customer con-
75 See notes 56-60 & accompanying text supra.
76 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 4, at 415 (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. at 303;
Comment, No Expectation, supra note 4, at 431).
77 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, at 415-16.
78 Brief for Appellee at 6-7, United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435.
79 425 U.S. at 443 n.4.
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fidentiality. A bank-customer evidentiary privilege should therefore be
examined in relation to the Katz balance between the benefits to cus-
tomer privacy and the effect upon law enforcement efficiency.
While privileges between attorney and client, doctor and patient,
husband and wife, clergyman and penitent, and journalist and source
have long been recognized,80 an evidentiary privilege between bank cus-
tomer and his bank never has developed.8' The earliest of these testimo-
nial privileges to be established was between lawyer and client.82 At
common law, this privilege initially was conceived as a device for avoid-
ing the embarrassing situation of a lawyer testifying against his own fee-
paying client. The rationale underlying the attorney-client privilege to-
day is that such a privilege encourages clients to disclose all relevant
information that affects the lawyer's preparation of the client's case,
thereby promoting justice.83
Another evidentiary privilege, which has statutory rather than
common law origins, is that between doctor and patient.8 4 States have
enacted this privilege to encourage the patient to disclose freely informa-
tion pertinent to the doctor's diagnosis.85 The scope of the privilege en-
compasses all information obtained by the doctor in examination or
observation which is relevant and necessary to the treatment of the pa-
80 J. WALTZ, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 242-54 (1975).
81 LeValley & Lancy, The IRS Summons and the Duty of Confidentialiy: A Hobson r Choice for
Bankers, 89 BANKING LJ. 979 (1972). Nevertheless, banks have been held liable on theories of
implied breach of contract, agency, and property for customer record disclosure to private
third parties. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936), rev'd, 105 F.2d 583
(3d Cir. 1939) (agency); Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969) (implied contract); Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284
(1961) (agency); Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (Ch. 1929) (property); Sparks v.
Union Trust Co., 256 N.C. 478, 124 S.E.2d 365 (1962) (implied contract); Tournier v. Na-
tional Provincial & Union Bank, [1924] 1 K.B. 461 (implied contract). Courts have also em-
ployed tort principles to prohibit banks from divulging customer information. See Sewall v.
Catlin, 3 Wend. 291, 294-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829).
Evidence of fiduciary duties that can be enforced by implied contract principles does not
prove the existence of an evidentiary privilege: "IT]he mere fact that a communication was
made in express confidence, or in the implied confidence of a confidential relation, does not
create a privilege." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286, at 528 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
82 J. WALTZ, supra note 80, at 242. The privilege was developed under common law, but
has been codified in some jurisdictions. Id The rule has been stated as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his capatci as
such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (1) made in confdence, (5) by the client, (6)
are at his istance peranent protected (7) from pennanent disclosure by himsef or by the legal
advisor, (8) except the protection be waived
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 81, § 2292, at 554 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
83 J. WALTZ, supra note 80, at 242.
84 Id at 247. See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 98-99,
at 212-13 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
85 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 84, § 98, at 213, Without the privilege, patients might also
be discouraged from consulting a doctor if disclosure of information were not protected.
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tient. 86 Almost every state has enacted statutes relating to medical rec-
ord confidentiality. 87 State legislatures have determined that promoting
patient-doctor interaction is a sufficiently valuable goal so as to exclude
testimony from evidence even though it is often valuable to the resolu-
tion of the case.
The extensive statutory protection of the doctor-patient relation-
ship has not provided an impetus for statutory protection of the bank-
customer relationship. While many states have restricted bank docu-
ment disclosure either by caselaw8 8 or through legislative enactments, 89
no state has codified a bank-customer evidentiary privilege. The diffi-
culty in creating such a privilege is to avoid overbroad protection. Ob-
viously, many customer documents are invaluable for determining
whether the tax laws or other statutes have been violated. Accordingly,
the public interest is not best served by totally excluding this informa-
tion from government inquiry.90
86 Id § 100, at 215.
87 See R. SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAws, 1978-79 10-12
(1978), for a listing of laws governing medical record disclosure. For a representative sam-
pling of medical record confidentiality statutes, see ALA. CODE §§ 22-16-2, -12, -20 (1975)
(physicians must file confidential venereal disease reports with the state); ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.30.260 (1979) (mental health patient records can be disclosed only when patient or the
court authorizes disclosure); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2235 (1956) (physicians subject to a
privilege in most circumstances); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Rule 503 (1947) (privilege ap-
plies to physicians, surgeons, trained nurses, and psychiatrists); CAL. EVID. CODE § 992 (West
1966) (recognizes doctor-patient privilege); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-801 (1973) (provides for
disclosure to patient of his records); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-295c (West 1958) (state
institution can only release information to third parties in order to obtain funding); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 702 (1974) (venereal disease reports are to be treated with strict confi-
dentiality); and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 907 (1974) (physician-patient privilege does not
apply in child abuse cases).
88 Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs, 224 So. 2d 759; Peterson v. Idaho First
Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284; Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34; Sparks v.
Union Trust Co., 256 N.C. 478, 124 S.E.2d 365.
89 ALA. CODE § 5-3A-3 (1975) (unlawful to make or report any list of names of depositors
or to disclose any depositor information); ALASKA STAT. §§ 06.05.175, 06.30.120 (1978) (all
account information is confidential and cannot be disclosed unless under court order, and the
depositor must be notified unless disclosure is made under a search warrant issued by or at the
behest of a grand jury); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7470 (West 1980) (bank customer is entitled to
ten-day notice to move to quash subpoena before government agents can obtain bank cus-
tomer records); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16 1/2, § 148.1 (1979) (banks may not disclose customer
information without customer authorization, subpoena, or request by a regulatory agency);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 527.10 (West 1970) (data processing center cannot obtain customer infor-
mation unless essential to the completion of the transaction); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3571
(West 1980) (financiaf institution or credit card company may release customer information
under subpoena only upon advance notice to customer); MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 1-302
(1980) (financial institutions may disclose customer information under subpoena which gives
advance notice to the customer or if the customer authorizes such disclosure).
90 Indeed, this potential for overinclusivity has been noted by authors in analyzing the
medical evidentiary privilege: "[One problem is] [t]he suppression of what is ordinarily the
best source of proof, namely, the physician who examined and treated the patient, upon what
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For instance, an absolute evidentiary privilege would have denied
the grand jury in Miller access to the information even if a valid search
warrant had been issued. Therefore, the optimal balance is best ob-
tained through a statute that establishes as a general rule that customer
documents are confidential and may only be disclosed according to legal
process. The government should be required to be specific in the docu-
ments it requests and to prove the relevancy of the documents sought
before the confidential bank-customer relationship can be invaded.91
While the protection of bank-customer confidence is a laudable
goal, the creation of a bank-customer evidentiary privilege is an im-
proper method for effectuating that goal. One reason for the inadvisa-
bility of a bank-customer evidentiary privilege is that the rationale for
the creation of most privileges--encouragement of free and open disclo-
sure of information so that the best resolution of the problem is en-
sured-is less applicable to banking services than to legal or medical
services. Clients would forego an attorney's services if the subject matter
of their discussions was not kept confidential. Patients might minimize
their use of medical services if their discussions became part of the court-
room record. Yet few banking customers are aware of the customer doc-
ument disclosure policies of their banks and therefore are not likely to be
dissuaded from utilizing banking services for fear of record disclosure.
Another reason for the inadvisability of a bank-customer eviden-
tiary privilege is that while the attorney-client relationship promotes the
interests of justice and the doctor-patient relationship promotes the sav-
ing of lives, the bank-depositor relationship promotes only the free flow
of capital. This seemingly less weighty social goal could be better
achieved by protecting customer privacy through a statute that would
require government officials to use a valid search warrant, subpoena, or
summons and by granting standing to the depositor to contest the valid-
ity of the access request.
Considering these difficulties with the bank-customer evidentiary
privilege, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will recognize such a
privilege.92 The Court had occasion to address the scope of the attor-
ney-client evidentiary privilege in Fsher v. United States.93 The defend-
ant taxpayers were being investigated for possible violation of the
income tax laws. They compiled papers which had been prepared by
is usually a crucial issue, namely, the physical or mental condition of the patient." C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 84, at 226.
91 See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 7470-90 (West 1980); ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 16 1/2, § 148.1
(1979); MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. 1-302 (1980).
92 Federal courts refuse to recognize a bank-customer evidentiary privilege. See United
States v. Nelson, 486 F. Supp. 464 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
54 F.R.D. 21, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
93 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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their accountants and then transferred these documents to their attor-
neys. When the attorneys refused to give up the documents after receiv-
ing IRS summonses, the government brought enforcement actions to
compel disclosure. In response to the government's action, the taxpayers
asserted that the attorney-client privilege prevented the disclosure of the
documents.
The Fsher Court stated initially that the privilege applied only in
situations where the client would not have consulted with the attorney
but for the privilege.94 Furthermore, the Court established that if the
documents were unobtainable directly from the client then the transfer
of the documents to the attorney would still be protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege.95 However, the Court concluded that the fifth
amendment protection against self-incrimination was not violated be-
cause the disclosure of the accountant's workpapers then in the posses-
sion of the attorney would not require the taxpayer to "restate, repeat,
or affirm the truth of the contents of the documents sought." 96 Since the
Court stated that the taxpayer could not defeat a governmental sub-
poena directly based upon the incriminating nature of the evidence, 97 it
concluded that the information conveyed through the production of the
documents did not rise to the level of testimonial self-incrimination.98
Therefore, the Court held that compliance with the summons ordering
the taxpayer to produce the accountant's documents would involve no
incriminating evidence and accordingly no violation of the fifth amend-
ment.
The analysis of the Fischer Court arguably could deny evidentiary
protection to a depositor. Many documents compiled by a bank, such as
statements and deposit slips, are owned by the bank and are utilized for
internal banking purposes. If the IRS were examining the potential
civil or criminal liability of a customer, and the customer retained an
attorney and ordered the bank to send the documents to aid the attor-
ney in preparation of the customer's defense, then conceivably if the
IRS subpoenaed the documents from the attorney, the Court could rely
on Fisher to deny the customer the protection of the attorney-client priv-
ilege. While the Miller Court specifically chose not to decide this eviden-
tiary privilege issue, examination of its benefits, other available
alternatives, and previous Court decisions in the privilege area compel
the conclusion that a bank-customer privilege would neither be desira-
ble nor realistically obtainable.
94 Id at 403.
95 Id at 405.
96 Id at 409.
97 I d at 409-10.
98 Id at 411.
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THE CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT TEST
While the Court's handling of Miller's constitutional and eviden-
tiary claims indicates that the Court developed an unsound rule of law,
the Miller decision must be analyzed with the standing tests used by the
Supreme Court today. Subsequent to Miller, the Court has cited four
factors99 which determine whether an interest is protected by the fourth
amendment. Justice Powell enunciated these four factors in Rakas v. IN1-
nois. In his concurring opinion in Rakas, 00 Justice Powell stated that
"the ultimate question. . . is whether one's claim to privacy from gov-
ernment intrusion is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circum-
stances."'10
Justice Powell's first factor is whether the defendant has taken pre-
cautions to protect his privacy interest from governmental intrusion. 0 2
The Miller Court implicitly faulted the depositor for failure to protect
his privacy interest. 103 One commentator has noted, however, that this
99 An additional factor developed by the Court to determine reasonable privacy expecta-
tions is not germane to the privacy claims of bank depositors. In several cases, the Court
relied upon the power of the defendant to exclude others from the premises searched as indic-
ative of the presence of a fourth amendment interest. For instance, in Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, the Court determined that the defendant who was staying in the apartment of a
friend had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. The Court emphasized that
Jones had a key to the apartment and with the exception of his friend, "Jones had complete
dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others from it." Rakas v. Illi-
nois, 439 U.S. at 149.
Like the power to exclude others from living premises, the caller's power to exclude
others from a public telephone booth indicates a legitimate privacy expectation. In Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, the defendant occupied the phone booth and shut the door to
exclude other callers, thereby evidencing legitimate privacy expectations. Thus, "Katz and
Jones could legitimately expect privacy in the areas which were the subject of the search and
seizure each sought to contest." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 149. Conversely, the Court has
determined that a defendant's inability to exclude others indicates an unreasonable privacy
expectation. In Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S. Ct. 2556, the Court emphasized Rawlings'
inability to exclude others from the purse in which he had placed drugs as proof of his unrea-
sonable privacy expectation.
The common element in these three cases is that the defendant's ability to protect the
privacy of the searched premises determined the legitimacy of the privacy expectation. This
analysis cannot properly be applied to bank records for the customer is not concerned about
excluding agents from the premises of the bank, but rather from the information contained in
his bank statements and checks. Even if the premises are defined as file cabinets or computer
tapes, a depositor's inability to exclude others is not proof of an unreasonable privacy expec-
tation. The distinction is that the defendants inJones and Katz had the possibility to exclude
others from the area searched. A bank depositor has no legal right and no practical means to
restrict access to a public bank or to the files owned by the bank. Therefore, because a bank
customer has no legal or practical basis upon which to protect his bank record privacy, his
inability to do so does not evidence an unreasonable privacy expectation.
100 439 U.S. at 150-56 (Powell, J., concurring).
101 Id at 152.
102 Id
103 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351).
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assumption of risk basis for denying standing to bank depositors would
invalidate other instances in which the Court has found a legitimate
privacy expectation. 104
Following Justice Powell's test, some courts have attempted to eval-
uate the reasonableness of an expectation in terms of the precautions the
individual could have taken to prevent such intrusions. 10 5 One author
has suggested that only reasonable precautions be required and that rea-
sonableness be defined on an individual case-by-case basis in light of the
area being searched.
While a depositor might take some precautions to protect his
financial privacy, none are reasonable. First, he might shield his
financial affairs by conducting all his commercial transactions in cash.
This alternative has been disregarded as unrealistic for "it is impossible
104 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 11.3, at 569. LaFave argues that in Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, the defendant could be characterized as having taken that risk by stash-
ing the narcotics in his friend's apartment. The logical response, however, is that a friend's
apartment is more private than a commercial bank, and therefore arguably the defendant in
Jones did not assume the risk of public disclosure to the same degree that the defendant did in
Miller.
LaFave also contends that the assumption of risk analysis could upset the result reached
in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). The defendant in Bumper was convicted
of rape. A rifle used as evidence to convict him was found in the kitchen of his grandmother's
house and was seized by police with an invalid consent from the defendant's grandmother.
The evidence was suppressed, but LaFave argues that the defendant could be viewed as hav-
ing assumed the risk of public disclosure by leaving the gun in the common area of the house.
This again can be distinguished from Miller because even common areas of a home de-
serve more privacy protection than a bank. The Court has often found the home worthy of
fourth amendment protection. See Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 nn.8-9 (1962),
which cites cases in which the explicit protection of homes within the language of the fourth
amendment has been liberally construed. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582
(1946) (store); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (store); Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298 (1921) (business office); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920) (business office).
LaFave's application of the assumption of risk rationale to the facts in Mancusi v. De-
Forte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) is more persuasive. In Mancusi, the state officials without a war-
rant seized records from a union office which was shared by several workers. The Court held
that DeForte, one of the office workers, had standing to contest the seizure because he could
legitimately expect records in the office to be kept safe. Yet, it could be argued that DeForte
knowingly exposed these papers to public view. He shared the office and he did not allege
that the papers were taken from an area he exclusively used. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. at
368. Therefore, conceivably DeForte assumed the risk that these papers would be made
public and, thus, under the Miller assumption of risk analysis, he would not have been
granted standing to contest the invalid search.
105 Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 914 (1971) (the court held that an F.B.I. agent standing on a ladder using binoculars
to see in defendant's window was not performing an unreasonable search because the defend-
ant could have curtained the window), and United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.
1975), aj'd i part and reu'd in part on rehearing, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (the
circuit court rejected arguments by narcotics agents that marijuana found on rural farm
property was legally obtained because the defendant had failed to fence the property and to
post private property signs), cited in Note, A Reconsideration, supra note 33, at 169-70.
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to participate in the economic life of contemporary society without
maintaining a checking account."' 1 6
With the majority of Americans maintaining at least one checking
account, "the check is firmly established as a major component of the
U.S. payments mechanism."' 0 7 Most customers would resist conducting
their financial affairs in cash. The check is a proven tool which satisfies
consumer functional requirements of a safe medium of exchange while
also satisfying consumer needs by providing physical evidence that the
financial transaction has been completed.108 Thus, requiring consumers
to use cash for all commercial transactions in order to protect their pri-
vacy interests is unreasonable and economically unfeasible.
A depositor might also attempt to contract with his bank to ensure
no disclosure of his banking information without authorization by the
depositor. The American Civil Liberties Union has recommended that
a depositor enter into a contract that would require his bank to notify
the depositor if attempts are made to secure his records and which
would prohibit the release of bank information absent depositor consent
or a judicially enforced subpoena.'0 9 The difficulty with this precau-
tionary measure is that the expectation of privacy test only requires that
reasonable measures be taken to prevent invasive searches and seizures.
It seems unreasonable to require a depositor to contract with his bank to
ensure privacy protection when most depositors believe their records are
already confidential. Since neither customer avoidance of checking ac-
counts nor contractual arrangements between bank and customer are
realistic alternatives, a depositor like Miller has no reasonable precau-
tionary measures available to him.
A second factor cited by Justice Powell in Rakas is whether the his-
tory of the fourth amendment sheds light on whether or not the area
searched was within the scope of the amendment's protection.1 0 While
the authority Justice Powell cites for the historical factor does not di-
rectly address bank customer privacy, it does indicate that traditionally
the warrant clause of the fourth amendment was intended to protect
against invasions of one's person, house, papers, and effects."' In con-
cluding that a person's footlocker was entitled to privacy protection, the
106 Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d at 247, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
107 Electronic Banking, Inc., supra note 1, at 138. -
108 Id "Consumers use checks to pay bills, to make purchases at the point-of-sale and to
obtain cash. Most payroll checks are deposited in a checking account. It is obvious that the
check is seen by consumers as the most satisfying means by which to conduct their financial
affairs." Id
109 See CIVIL LIBERTIES, Oct. 1972, at 3, died in Comment, supra note 33, at 1442 n.15.
110 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 153 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1977)).
111 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 8.
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Court in United States v. Chadwick acknowledged that the framers in-
tended to extend fourth amendment protection beyond governmental
invasions existing in the colonial era: "What we do know is that the
Framers were men who focused on the wrongs of that day but who in-
tended the Fourth Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which
would far outlast the specific abuses which gave it birth."11 2
Privacy is the fundamental value deserving protection within the
flexible parameters of the fourth amendment. In wording the fourth
amendment to encompass a citizen's person, home, papers, and effects,
the framers sought to protect the privacy interests of citizens in those
areas and items. While a footlocker is not enumerated as a protected
fourth amendment area, and thus would not deserve protection under a
literal reading of the fourth amendment, the Chadwick Court recognized
that the defendant reasonably expected his locker to be opened only
with his consent. His reasonable privacy expectation created the pri-
vacy interest that triggered the protection of the fourth amendment.
Similarly, bank depositors reasonably expect their bank documents
to remain private: "The disclosure by the depositor to the bank is made
for the limited purpose of facilitating the conduct of his financial affairs;
it seems evident that his expectation of privacy is not diminished by the
bank's retention of a record of such disclosures."" 3 Thus, the deposi-
tor's privacy expectation in his bank records creates the privacy interest
protected by the fourth amendment.
In addition to protecting the changing legitimate privacy expecta-
tions of citizens, the fourth amendment must also encompass the chang-
ing methods used by government to invade the privacy of citizens. In
1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis recognized the danger to pri-
vacy of new technology:
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step
which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to
the individual . ..the right 'to be let alone.' Instantaneous photographs
and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the
prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from
the house-tops."' 14
Similarly, today's commentators recognize that new technology in-
creases the potential for privacy invasion: "The insidious, far-reaching
and indiscriminate nature of electronic surveillance ...makes it al-
most, although not quite, as destructive of liberty, as 'the kicked-in
112 Id at 9.
113 Burrows v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 244, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
114 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to thiacy
,
4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
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door.'"115 The continuing development of methods and vehicles for
invading the privacy of citizens, such as the photocopying of all cus-
tomer banking transactions necessitates that "judicial interpretations of
the reach of the constitutional protection of individual privacy must
keep pace with the perils created by these new devices." 16 Failure to
expand fourth amendment protection "opens'the door to a vast and un-
limited range of very real abuses of police power." 17 Thus, reference to
the historical underpinnings of the fourth amendment fortifies the con-
clusion that bank documents should be entitled to privacy protection
within the "persons, houses, papers and effects"' 118 clause which defines
its scope.
A third factor enumerated by Justice Powell for determining the
existence of a legitimate privacy expectation is the manner in which the
claimant used the premises searched. 119 Justice Powell cited Jones v.
United States 120 as an example of use of the premises creating a legitimate
privacy expectation. In Jones, the defendant was a guest in an apart-
ment that was unlawfully searched. In concluding that the defendant
possessed a reasonable privacy expectation, the Court focused upon the
facts that he had been staying in the apartment and had stored his be-
longings there.
The manner in which a depositor uses a bank account will likely
determine the legitimacy of his privacy expectation. Joint or corporate
accounts arguably might diminish an individual depositor's privacy ex-
pectation because of the additional persons entitled to oversee the man-
agement of these accounts. However, individual depositor accounts are
necessarily opened, managed, and ultimately closed with the sole partic-
ipation of the depositor and the bank officer. As such, the depositor
legitimately utilizes his account with the expectation that his transac-
tions will be known only to the bank. '
Powell's fourth indicator of a legitimate privacy _expectation is
whether the defendant can claim a proprietary or posses sory interest in
the items seized. While ownership of the seized evidence will not give
the defendant automatic standing, the Court has stated that that "prop-
erty ownership is clearly a factor to be considered in determining
whether an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have been vio-
lated."'21
115 Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 389.
116 Burrows v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 244, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
117 d at 244, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
118 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
119 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 153 (Powell, J., concurring).
120 362 U.S. 257.
121 United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. at 2553.
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The Miller majority refused the depositor standing because he
could not claim either ownership or possession of his bank records. 122 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court declined to adopt the common law
precept that cancelled checks were the property of the depositor. 23
Banks were required to return the cancelled checks to the depositor for
he was thought to possess a superior right to them.124 Therefore, argua-
bly a bank customer can assert standing on ownership of at least his
cancelled checks.125 To the extent that a defendant like Miller can es-
tablish ownership of his bank documents, he can contest the validity of
subpoenas issued to gain access to those documents.
The second vehicle for upholding a depositor's property right to
contest seizure of his bank records is to conceptualize information as
property. Brex v. Smith 126 and Zimmerman v. Wilson 127 held that deposi-
tors possessed a right to contest government subpoenas issued for their
bank records. The courts based their conclusion upon the theory that:
"It is the information the bankers' books contain, and not the books in
which that information is recorded, that is the property right of these
taxpayers, a property right this court protects by injunctive relief."'1 28
122 425 U.S. at 440.
123 2 J. MOORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BANKS AND BANKING § 460 (1928).
124 Id
125 Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a bank depositor owns his checks. Section 4-
201 states: "(1) Unless a contrary intent clearly appears ... the bank is an agent or sub-
agent of the owner of the item. . . ." In the official comment to § 4-201, the commentators
state that the practical result of the agency status is that the "risk of loss continues in the
owner of the item rather than the agent bank."
Relying upon the direction of the Code, courts have also acknowledged that the cus-
tomer owns his checks. See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 161
F. Supp. 790 (D. Mass. 1958) (where a bank received checks endorsed without restriction, the
rights of the depositor as owner of the checks were subject to the bank's rights resulting from
the outstanding advances on the checks); Mercantile Bank & Trust Co. v. Hunter, 31 Colo.
App. 200, 501 P.2d 486 (1972) (where the payee of a check endorsed it and deposited it to his
account in the plaintiff bank, the payee remained the owner of the check and the plaintiff
bank was an agent for collection.
The argument that a property interest springs from a depositor's bank statements and
other banking records provided by the bank is more tenuous. However, the California
Supreme Court in Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal.
Rptr. at 169, refused to be restricted by a narrow property concept to determine privacy
protection:
[A]lthough the record establishes that copies of petitioner's bank statements rather than
of his checks were provided to the officer, the distinction is not significant with relation to
petitioner's expectation of privacy. That the bank alters the form in which it records the
information transmitted to it by the depositor to show the receipt and disbursement of
money on a bank statement does not diminish the depositor's anticipation of privacy in
the matters in which he confides to the bank.
Id
126 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34.
127 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936), however the case's holding concerning the brokerage
records was reversed in Zimmerman v. Wilson, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1939).
128 81 F.2d at 849. Support for this informational property concept can be found in the
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Thus, the information contained in the documents constituted the
fourth amendment protected interest. 129
While not expressly relying upon the concept of information as
property, two decisions of the California Supreme Court have found
that information contained in customer bank and credit card records
constituted a protected privacy interest. In Burrows v. Superior Court,130
the court held that a bank depositor possesses a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his bank records and stressed that the bank record informa-
tion created the reasonable privacy expectation. In a more recent pri-
vacy decision, the California Supreme Court extended the reasonable
expectation analysis to credit card holders. In People v. Blair,131 the
court defined the proper inquiry as "whether there is an expectation of
privacy in the information sought; such an expectation may exist even
in the briefest encounter between the persons who impart and receive
the information."'13 2 In concluding that society adjudges as reasonable
customer privacy expectations in credit card information, the court fo-
cused upon the revealing nature of credit records:
As with bank statements, a person who uses a credit card may reveal
his habits, his opinions, his tastes, and political views, as well as his move-
ments and financial affairs. No less than a bank statement, the charges
made on a credit card may provide 'a virtual current biography' of an
individual.' 33
In finding a protectable privacy interest, both the Blair and Burrows
courts emphasized the information being sought, not the instrument in
which it was conveyed. While Burrows had an arguable property right
in his checks, Blair could claim no proprietary interest in his credit state-
ment, yet both defendants possessed privacy rights protected under the
California Constitution. Similarly, the Miller Court should have looked
beyond proprietary and possessory interests in the bank documents and
focused primarily on whether the defendant possessed a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in the seized information.
Uniform Commercial Code. Section 3-804 provides that the owner of a check which is lost
may still recover from a party liable thereon upon proof of his ownership. The import of this
section is that the owner's rights inhere not in the piece of paper, but in the information
contained in the check. Under this analysis then, whether the information is contained on a
customer's check or in his bank statement prepared by the bank is irrelevant. Both instru-
ments reveal the same customer information and therefore both warrant fourth amendment
privacy protection.
129 "In other words, the privacy interest has in fact followed the information, while the law
has followed the material records as tangible objects of possession. It is this discordance be-
tween fact and law which undermines the reasoning used in cases such as United States v.
Mller." Comment, No Expectation, supra note 4, at 424.
130 13 Cal. 3d 238,-529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166.
131 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979).
132 d at 654, 602 P.2d at 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
133 Id at 652, 602 P.2d at 745, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
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As an alternative to the actual ownership basis for entitlement to
fourth amendment standing the defendant might assert a possessory in-
terest in the item seized under the constructive possession doctrine first
formulated in Schwimmer v. United States.13 4 In Schwimmer, the Eighth
Circuit concluded that while a taxpayer had released possession of his
personal records by placing them with a storage company, nevertheless
he could assert his fourth amendment rights against a government sub-
poena of the documents. The court depicted the storage company as a
"naked possessor of the documents"1 35 and said that the government
should not be allowed to employ a third party to procure the records.
Similarly, a bank depositor releases possession of his checks to the
bank with the understanding that the customer maintains a possessory
interest in the checks. The bank functions as a financial intermediary,
and like a storage company, retains no permanent possessory interest in
the items deposited in it. Both stored goods and cancelled checks even-
tually are returned to the customer. Thus, the Miller Court could have
employed constructive possession principles to imbue the seized checks
with a depositor possessory interest in the seized bank documents. This
possessory interest would then provide the basis upon which a bank de-
positor could claim that "he himself was the victim of an invasion of
privacy."' 36 Whether asserting a property interest based upon the bank
documents or upon the information contained therein, or a possessory
interest stemming from the constructive possession doctrine, a depositor
legitimately should be entitled to contest invalid seizures of his bank
documents.
THE K4Tz REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY TEST
While the Court often relies upon the factors developed in Rakas to
determine the legitimacy of privacy expectations, these factors are only
aides in answering the ultimate question whether the defendant pos-
sessed any reasonable expectation of privacy. The appropriate test of a
reasonable expectation originated in the Court's seminal standing deci-
sion in Katz v. United States.' 37 The Katz test requires that the defendant
possess an actual expectation of privacy that society considers reason-
able. Although Katz predated Miller, and the Supreme Court has since
established additional indicia of a fourth amendment privacy interest,
examination of claims to fourth amendment protection under the Katz
two-pronged test is essential. In determining whether government con-
134 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 883 (1956). See also Brown v. United
States, 411 U.S. at 230 n.4.
135 232 F.2d at 861.
136 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 261.
137 389 U.S. 347.
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duct constitutes an unreasonable search in contravention of the fourth
amendment, the Court has indicated that "our lodestar is Katz"'138 and
has consistently invoked the Katz expectation of privacy test to analyze
alleged governmental encroachment on fourth amendment freedoms. 139
Because the Court consistently relies upon Katz to determine the
existence of reasonable privacy expectations, in order to assert protec-
tion of the fourth amendment bank depositors must actually expect
their bank records to be private and society must adjudge their expecta-
tions reasonable. The passage of federal and state legislation protecting
depositors against unrestricted government access to their bank records
and state court decisions granting depositors state constitutional privacy
protection today create actual depositor privacy expectations. These ac-
tual expectations conform with society's norms as expressed through its
legislatures and courts. Thus, under the Katz test, depositors possess a
reasonable privacy expectation protected by the fourth amendment.
In light of the Court's repeated reliance on the Katz decision as the
proper fourth amendment interest test, the Miller Court's summary re-
jection of the Katz analysis is puzzling. Although the defendant argued
that the records maintained by the bank in accordance with the Bank
Secrecy Act were ones in which he possessed a reasonable privacy expec-
tation, Justice Powell rejected the application of the Katz expectation of
privacy analysis by citing the competing Katz concept that when one
exposes to the public that which was initially private, fourth amend-
ment interests are thereafter waived. 14
Instead of carefully analyzing the case in light of the Katz expecta-
tion of privacy test, the Miller Court ignored the components of the le-
gitimate expectation of privacy test enunciated by Justice Harlan 14 1 and
abruptly concluded that Miller had no standing to challenge govern-
ment subpoenas. Had the Court faithfully analyzed Miller in light of
the broad expectation of privacy analysis of Katz, it might first have
attempted to fashion a reasonable basis for deciding which customer in-
formation is public and which is sufficiently personal so as to warrant
fourth amendment protection.
In People v. Elder,142 the California Court of Appeals for the Fourth
District faced a similar task in holding that telephone and gas compa-
138 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 739.
'39 See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentudky, 100 S. Ct. at 2561; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 739;
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 7; United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14; Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); United States
v. White, 401 U.S. at 752 (plurality opinion); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. at 368; Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
140 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
141 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
142 63 Cal. App. 3d 731, 134 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1976).
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nies did not violate a customer's right to privacy by releasing their
names and addresses. In so holding, the court distinguished between the
privacy interest accorded to general descriptive information and to in-
formation that reveals the customer's beliefs, associations, and activi-
ties: 143
Name and address relate to identification rather than disclosure of pri-
vate, personal affairs. It is virtually impossible to live in our current soci-
ety without repeated disclosure of name and address, both privately and to
the government. While a myriad of reasons motivate some to reduce the
degree of their identity before the public eye which includes, for example,
subscribing to an unlisted telephone number, this quest for anonymity
does not compel the conclusion that a reasonable expectation of privacy
existed on the facts before us.144
In Burrows v. Superior Court,145 the California Supreme Court applied
the distinction drawn in Elder to records of bank transactions. The
court stated: "In the course of such dealings [with a bank], a depositor
reveals many aspects of his personal affairs, opinions, habits and associa-
tions. Indeed, the totality of bank records provides a virtual current
biography."' 146 Because banks record such specific personal information,
the court held that such records deserve greater protection than general
descriptive information. Thus, bank records contain information which
warrants reasonable privacy expectations whereas privacy expectations
concerning customer names and addresses, in most cases, would be un-
reasonable. Recognition of this distinction could have freed the Miller
court to extend the Katz logic to embrace private documents while re-
taining sufficient flexibility to deny extension of privacy to unwarranted
cases.
In addition to failing to recognize the public/private distinction,
the Miller Court neglected to divide the Katz test into its component
parts:147 "[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) ex-
143 Id at 737-38, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
144 Id. at 737-38.
145 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166.
146 1d at 247, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
147 Justice Harlan's breakdown of the Katz expectation of privacy test has been relied upon
by the courts in later decisions, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 142-43 n.12; Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. at 9; United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 329 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.W. 3246 (Oct. 6, 1980); United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); Government of Virgin Islands v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055, 1061 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969); Stark v. Connally, 347 F. Supp. 1242, 1247 (N.D. Cal.
1972), aj'd in part, reo'd in part sub nom., California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21;
People v. Berutko, 71 Cal. 2d 84, 93 n.8, 453 P.2d 721, 726, 77 Cal. Rptr. 217, 222 (1969), and
has been cited by legal commentators, see 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 4, § 2.1, at 227; Amster-
dam, supra note 26, at 384; Note, supra note 34, at 504 n.88; Note, The Concept of Ai'vaq and the
Fourth Amendment, 6 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 154, 179-80 (1972).
Nevertheless, Justice Harlan later retreated somewhat from his initial formulation of the
Katz test: "The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or
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pectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "148 Subsequent to Katz,
lower courts have generally applied this bifurcated analysis. 149
In discussing the actual expectation component, Justice Harlan
stated that for a given governmental intrusion to be held unreasonable,
an individual actually must expect his action to be private. Yet defining
reasonableness in terms of actual knowledge can potentially deny to in-
dividuals traditional fourth amendment protection.15 0 For instance, so-
ciety could be conditioned to possess no actual expectations of privacy
and therefore no searches conducted under this standard could be deter-
mined unreasonable: "[T]he government could diminish each person's
subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on
television that 1984 was being advanced by a decade and that we were
all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveil-
lance."'-51
The Supreme Court has recognized the inadequacy of measuring
fourth amendment interests based upon actual expectations. Because of
the ephemeral nature of such expectations, the Court has stated that
"where an individual's subjective expectations had been 'conditioned'
by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms,
those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in
ascertaining . . . the scope of the Fourth Amendment protection
... 152 Under circumstances5 3 in which governmental action de-
legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in
large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and
present." United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan's de-emphasis of the subjective expectation component of the Katz test
has been commended, see Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 384, as having recognized that subjec-
tive expectations can be eliminated by governmental declaration that such expectations are
no longer reasonable. While the subjective expectation inquiry has not been totally disre-
garded, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12, the Court is increasingly seeking to deter-
mine in fourth amendment privacy cases whether the interest asserted is one that society is
currently prepared to acknowledge as reasonable.
148 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
149 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 2.7, at 413 n.54. LaFave has criticized the Court for not
having employed these two components of the Katz privacy test in arriving at its Miller hold-
ing. Id at 413-14.
150 See Note, A Reconsideration, supra note 33, at 157.
151 Amsterdam, supra note 26, at 384.
152 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5.
153 The Court described two such circumstances:
[I]f the government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes
henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact
entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects.
Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this Nation's traditions,
erroneously assumed that the police were continuously monitoring his telephone conver-




stroyed actual expectations, the Court said that "a normative inquiry
will be proper."' 154 Thus, the difficulty in defining fourth amendment
interests based upon actual customer expectations is that such expecta-
tions can be erased by governmental actions. 155 Because the purpose of
the fourth amendment is to protect private citizens from unlawful gov-
ernment searches, reliance on the actual expectation criterion alone
would be anomalous in that it allows government officials to defeat the
salutary purposes of the fourth amendment by increasing the frequency
of their unlawful practices.
However, total disregard of the actual expectation criterion is as
illogical as total reliance on this criterion. One commentator has postu-
lated a situation in which a citizen would possess an actual expectation
which would be adjudged unreasonable by society.
If two narcotics peddlers were to rely on the privacy of a desolate corner
of Central Park in the middle of the night to carry out an illegal transac-
tion, this would be a reasonable expectation of privacy; there would be
virtually no risk of discovery. Yet if by extraordinary good luck a patrol-
man were to illuminate the desolate spot with his flashlight, the criminals
would be unable to suppress the officer's testimony as a violation of their
rights under the fourth amendment. . . . [I]n order for an expectation to
be considered justified it is not sufficient that it be merely reasonable; it
must be based on something in addition to a high probability of freedom
from intrusion. The premise upon which the hypothetical criminals in
Central Park based their activities was realistic and involved little risk, but
there expectation was not "justified."'156
Thus, a citizen can possess an actual expectation, but not deserve fourth
amendment protection because the expectation is unreasonable.
Perhaps recognizing the deficiency of absolute reliance upon or re-
jection of the actual expectation criterion, the Katz Court required not
only that a depositor possess an actual privacy expectation, but also that
ld at 740-41 n.5.
154 Id at 741.
155 Cases in which privacy interests have been denied because no actual expectation was
found to exist can be separated into four categories: where prior frequent searches vitiate an
individual's privacy expectations in later searches; where the defendant was specifically noti-
fied by contract, regulation, or posted notice that the search was being conducted; where the
defendant's special status and knowledge about the search reduced his privacy expectation;
and where the court viewed the defendant's advance notice coupled with the later search as
an implied consent to the search. Note, A Reconsideration, supra note 33, at 157-64.
All four categories illustrate the potentially destructive scope of the actual expectation
criterion. The government could make abusive searches legal simply by conducting them
often enough to make the defendant aware of such procedures, could pass regulations or enter
into contracts allowing invasive searches, could specifically abuse groups who possess ex-
traordinary knowledge about police operations (i.e., parolees and probationers) and could
imply consent from those who, while cognizant of the upcoming search, did not for various
reasons object.
156 Note, Post-Katz Study, supra note 33, at 983.
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it be one that society recognizes as reasonable.15 7 However, the compo-
nents of the bifurcated Katz test often ask the same question: did the
governmental action violate a citizen's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy? Separate application of each component to privacy questions
generates circular reasoning because most citizens have actual privacy
expectations only in areas society has adjudged as worthy of privacy
protection.
Justice Harlan has recognized the need to acknowledge the interre-
lation of the two tests: "Our expectations . . . are in large part reflec-
tions of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past
and present."158 Thus, society's reasonable expectations create actual
customer privacy expectations. Conversely, most citizens have actual
expectations concerning interests generally protected by society. In the
majority of cases, the components will converge, thereby creating a situ-
ation in which actual expectations are ones which under a normative
inquiry, society has judged reasonable. These two components converge
in analyzing the question of bank customer privacy. Examination of
court decisions and statutes discussing bank customer privacy will
demonstrate this convergence.
To determine whether a depositor's expectation is reasonable,
courts normally examine the declarations of other courts and of legisla-
tures. Several recent state courts have merged the two Katz components
and have acknowledged that bank depositors possess reasonable privacy
expectations. Utilizing Katz, the California Supreme Court in Burrows v.
Superior Court159 framed a two-fold test for determining possible cus-
tomer privacy interests: whether the person has exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy and whether that expectation has been violated
by a reasonable governmental intrusion. 160 The first component of the
Burrows test subsumes the bifurcated Katz test and the second Burrows
component examines whether the government complied with the re-
quirements of legal process in conducting the search.
Applying this test to the facts of the case, the Burrows court stated
that "[a] bank customer's reasonable expectation is that, absent compul-
sion by legal process, the matters he reveals to the bank will be utilized
by the bank for internal banking purposes."' 161 In holding that the peti-
tioner's reliance on the confidentiality of his checks was justified, the
Burrows court found that the bank's ownership and possession of the
bank records did not vitiate the depositor's reasonable privacy expecta-
157 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
158 United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
159 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166.




tion in the records. By providing protection for bank depositors the Bur-
rows court recognized that because of new banking technologies, courts
must expand constitutional protection to ensure customer privacy:
Development of photocopying machines, electronic computers and other
sophisticated instruments have accelerated the ability of government to
intrude into areas which a person normally chooses to exclude from prying
eyes and inquisitive minds. Consequently judicial interpretations of the
reach of the constitutional protection of individual privacy must keep pace
with the perils created by these new devices.1 62
Agreeing with California that depositors possess reasonable privacy
expectations, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Suburban Trust
Co. v. Waller 163 said:
We think that a bank depositor in this State has a right to expect that
the bank will, to the extent permitted by law, treat as confidential, all
information regarding his account and any transaction relating thereto.
Accordingly, we hold that, absent compulsion by law, a bank may not
make any disclosures concerning a depositor's account without the express
or implied consent of the depositor.164
In holding that the depositor possessed a privacy right, the court re-
viewed early English law16 5 and American precedent 66 and concurred
with the California Supreme Court that a bank customer has a reason-
able expectation that his records will be used by the bank for internal
banking purposes. The Maryland court buttressed its conclusion that
bank depositors have reasonable privacy expectations by citing the legis-
lative efforts of the Maryland General Assembly to provide customer
protection. 167
While these courts have accorded depositors substantial privacy
protection, legislatures have been far more active in recognizing that
customer privacy expectations are reasonable. The most recent example
162 Id at 248, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
163 44 Md. App. 335, 408 A.2d 758 (1979).
164 Id at 341, 408 A.2d at 764.
165 See Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank, [1924] 1 K.B. 461, in which a
three-judge panel held that a bank had breached its implied contractual duty of nondisclo-
sure by commenting on the plaintiff's bank transactions to his employer.
166 See Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho at 588, 367 P.2d at 290. The Court
found that the American rule was accurately described by the Peterson court:
It is inconceivable that a bank would at any time consider itself at liberty to disclose
the intimate details of its depositors' accounts. Inviolate secrecy is one of the inherent
and fundamental precepts of the relationship of the bank and its customers or depositors.
This high ethical standard is recognized by the defendant bank in the instant case ....
It is implicit in the contract of the bank with its customer or depositor that no
information may be disclosed by the bank or its employees concerning the customer's or
depositor's account.
Id
167 The Maryland legislature has stated the goal of the bank customer privacy legislation is
that "the confidential relationships between fiduciary institutions and their customers must
be preserved and protected." MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 1-302 (1980).
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of society's willingness to recognize depositor privacy rights is the Right
to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.168 The importance of this Act be-
comes clear upon examination of previous banking statutes. The Miller
decision was predicated upon the Bank Secrecy Act, 169 which authorizes
the Secretary of the Treasury to require financial institutions to main-
tain duplicate records of virtually all transactions involving their cus-
tomers.'70 The government was able to request Miller's checks because
the banks had photocopies of them in accordance with the provisions of
the Act.
In the 1960s, banks commonly microfilmed customer checks to fa-
cilitate the operation of the bank recordkeeping systems. Microfilming
soon became costly and many banks discontinued this practice. 171 In
response to this decline in microfilming, Congress enacted the Bank Se-
crecy Act requiring banks to maintain copies of customer transactions
since these records possess "a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax
and regulatory investigations and proceedings."' 172 Therefore, because
federal law required Miller's banks to maintain copies of all his checks,
the agents were able to obtain them directly from the bank without hav-
ing to request the original cancelled checks from Miller.
Prior to Miller, Congress considered numerous bills which were
designed to protect bank customer financial information from unre-
strained government access. 173 Yet, the Miller decision provided the
168 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (Supps. III & IV 1979-80).
169 12 U.S.C. § 1829(b) (1970) (retention of records by insured banks); id § 1730(d) (reten-
tion of records by insured savings and loans); id §§ 1951-59 (retention of records by unin-
sured financial institutions); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-122 (1970) (reporting of domestic and foreign
currency transactions).
170 Section 1829b(d) of the Bank Secrecy Act provides in pertinent part:
Each insured bank shall make, to the extent that the regulation of the Secretary so re-
quire (1) a microfilm or other reproduction of each check, draft, or similar instrument
drawn on it and presented to it for payment; and (2) a record of each check, draft, or
similar instrument received by it for deposit or collection, together with an identification
of the party for whose account it is to be deposited or collected, unless the bank has
already made a record of the party's identity pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.
12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
171 California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. at 27.
172 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (quoting 12 U.S.C. 1829b(a)(1)); United States
v. White, 401 U.S. at 786 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
173 See, e.g., S. 3814, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (prohibiting a financial institution from
disclosing to any government representative copies of or information contained in financial
records of any account holder unless: (1) the account holder gave written consent; (2) the
government representative presented the financial institution with a customer authorization
card; and (3) the bank thereafter notified the customer of the request); S. 3828, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971) (introduced to preserve the confidential relationship between fiduciary institu-
tions and customers and to allow customer record disclosure only by customer written author-
ization or by court order); S. 2200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (introduced to ensure that
customers have the right to protection against unwarranted disclosure of their records and to
allow customer record disclosure only by customer authorization, administrative summons or
1981]
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final impetus for the enactment of banking privacy legislation embodied
in the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (RFPA).1 74 The final
report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission indicates that the
RFPA was passed to address problems created by the Miller Court's de-
nial of standing to depositors who wished to contest governmental
seizures of their bank records.1 75
The RFPA confers upon depositors much of the protection they
would have possessed had the Miller Court found a protectable privacy
interest in customer bank records. Under the RFPA, to secure posses-
subpoena, court order or judicial subpoena); H.R. 214, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (prohib-
ited the search of private, medical, or business records except as authorized by law); H.R.
8024, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (prohibited federal regulatory agencies of financial institu-
tions from approving the establishment or expansion of electronic funds transfers for a delay
period and authorized a commission to review use of such systems); S. 1343, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975) (prescribed standards and procedures for governing the disclosure of certain cus-
tomer financial records by financial institutions to government agencies).
174 The Act is entitled The Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control
Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-630 (1978), Title XI of which is named the Right to Financial Privacy
Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-630 §§ 1100-22 (1978). The RFPA is the product of various legisla-
tive committees:
The legislative history of RFPA is somewhat complicated. It was originally introduced
as H.R. 8133 on June 30, 1977. It then was incorporated as Title XI in H.R. 13088,
which was then amended and reintroduced as H.R. 13471. H.R. 13471 was favorably
reported out of committee on July 18, 1978. H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1978). Unfortunately, H.R. 13471 could not be acted on prior to the end of the session.
165 Cong. Rec. H12,335 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1978) (remarks of Rep. St. Germain). The
one-sentence H.R. 14279, however, was passed by the House and subsequently amended
in the Senate to include the provisions of H.R. 13471. 166 Cong. Rec. S18,476 (daily ed.
Oct. 12, 1978). It then returned to the House and was passed by resolution. 168 Cong.
Rec. H13,078 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978). The most useful legislative history document,
therefore, is the House Report No. 1383, which pertains to H.R. 13471.
Palmer & Palmer, supra note 4, at 198 n.18.
175 We were discussing the significance of the Miller decision and the very disturbing
consequences which that decision has, not just for banking, but for all other areas in the
private sector.
To resume, it demonstrated two important problems that the Commission has
sought to address: First, that the bank was under no obligation to withhold a depositor's
records or to advise him of its policy with respect to record disclosure; and, second, that
even when the depositor sought to challenge the Government's demand for his bank
records, he had no assertible interest in those records that would allow him to make such
a challenge. Existing law does not provide an individual with the tools he needs to pro-
tect his legitimate interests in the records many organizations keep about him ...
[T]he Commission recommends that Government agencies be required to use legal proc-
ess whenever they seek access to records other organizations hold about an individual,
and that the individual be given an assertible interest in the records so that he may
challenge the grounds and procedures for any disclosure.
Final Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commissio." Joint Heanng Before the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs and a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 12 (1977) (statement of Chairman Linowes of the Privacy Protection Study Commis-
sion). The legislative history also indicates that the RFPA was passed because of congres-
sional dissatisfaction with the Miller decision. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
34 (1978). Courts recognize that the RFPA was passed to restrict the Miller rule. See Han-
cock v. Marshall, 86 F.R.D. 209, 210 (1980) ("This Act is designed to limit the holding in
United States v. Miller").
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sion of a customer's records, the government must reasonably describe
the documents 7 6 and must employ one of the five legal means author-
ized by the RFPA for record requests. 177 The Act requires the govern-
ment to notify the customer of its request within ten to fourteen days
after it contacts the bank.'78 The customer has the right to challenge
the validity of the government's request. Thus, Congress legislatively
granted customers protection similar to that guaranteed by the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment.
The passage of the RFPA benefits depositors in several ways. 179
First, it is the only federal statute which delineates the rights of the de-
176 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (Supp. III 1979). The RFPA leaves untouched traditional rights of
banks to challenge government record requests as either overbroad or unduly burdensome.
See id § 3410(0.
177 The government can properly request customer records through five means: customer
authorization, id § 3404, administrative summons or subpoena, id § 3405, search warrant,
id § 3406, judicial subpoena, id § 3407, or formal written request, id § 3408. The method of
formal written request may only be used when the agency requesting the information has no
power to issue administrative summons or subpoenas. Furthermore, it does not empower an
agency to issue such requests and a banking institution may ignore the requests if it desires.
178 Id §§ 3405-08. Notice may be delayed under § 3409 if authorized by the federal dis-
trict court under limited circumstances and under § 3414(b) in emergency situations (physi-
cal injury, property damage or flight to avoid prosecution).
179 Ironically, while the RFPA was enacted to remedy the problems created by Miller,
some authors have suggested that even under the RFPA Miller could not have prevented his
indictment. Palmer & Palmer, sufira note 4, at 223. The authors contend that notice of the
access request could have been delayed until after the records had been obtained, presumably
relying on § 3414(b)(1)(C) which allows delay of customer notification if it is feared that
notice will motivate the suspect to flee to avoid prosecution. Therefore, they concluded that
once the fruits of the search were used to indict Miller, he could not move to suppress the
documents.
Alternatively, the authors may have based their conclusion on the fact that the subpoe-
nas in Miller were issued by a grand jury and the RFPA protections do not apply to grand
jury access requests, see 12 U.S.C. § 3413(i) (Supp. III 1979), although the RFPA does at-
tempt to limit further dissemination of the customer information derived from the access
request, see id § 3420. Here again Miller would enjoy a right but no remedy, for while the
RFPA ostensibly protects bank customer confidentiality, Miller would not be able to demand
the fruits of the search be excluded. See Palmer & Palmer, sufira note 4, at 223 n.l 16. "The
Section [3418] injunctive remedies, if they applied at all, would at most seem to allow nothing
more than the return or destruction of the records themselves, and not their fruits, where
RFPA noncompliance was shown." Id
Nevertheless, the RFPA could arguably apply to Miller if the United States attorney who
supervised the issuance of Mtiller subpoenas was classified as an employee of the Department
ofJustice. It could then be argued that an employee of a government agency was requesting
the documents. Since the RFPA applies to all federal government access requests, Miller
would be entitled to the protections under the RFPA. Under application of the RFPA,
Miller would be entitled to notice of the document request and would then file a motion to
quash, see id at 219 n.105, in the appropriate federal district court. See 12 U.S.C. § 3410(a)
(Supp. III 1979) (the appropriate court being the one which issued the subpoena). The court
would then make a determination as to whether the customer challenge was justified. If
Miller were successful, the court would deny the government access to his records. If the
court concluded the customer challenge was unwarranted, Miller would have to wait until
"the entry of a final order in. . .[the] legal proceeding initiated against him which arises out
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positor and the privacy protections he can expect when conducting his
banking transactions. Second, banks and government agencies will un-
derstand what procedures must be complied with before a customer's
private documents can be released. Finally, in relation to the Katz test,
the passage of the RFPA indicates that society recognizes that customer
protection is reasonable. Before the RFPA was enacted, the Supreme
Court in Miller perceived the legislature's views on depositor privacy
rights in these terms: "The lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy
concerning the information kept in bank records was assumed by Con-
gress in enacting the Bank Secrecy Act . . ,,"8o The passage of the
RFPA establishes that such are not the views of Congress and society
today. Instead, society has chosen, as indicated by congressional action,
to accord depositors a financial privacy right.
While the RFPA is the most comprehensive treatment of depositor
privacy rights, Congress' first response to depositor privacy rights was
§ 1205 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.181 The Act provides the bank
of or is based upon the financial records." Palmer & Palmer, supra note 4, at 221. Miller
could then raise the record access issue along with the other arguments advanced on appeal.
180 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43 (1976) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1)).
See also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. at 335.
181 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1205, 91 Stat. 1702 (1976) (codified as
I.R.C. § 7610). The power of the Internal Revenue Service to request customer records from
third-party banks is statutory. See I.R.C. §§ 7601-02. The Code authorizes the IRS to em-
ploy administrative subpoenas to gain access to customer documents. See id § 7603. The
Supreme Court has described the subpoena power of the IRS as inherently different from
subpoenas issued by courts:
[Administrative subpoena power] is not derived from the judicial function. It is more
analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy for power
to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or
even just because it wants assurance that it is not.
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950), quoted in United States v.
Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 148 (1975).
Administrative subpoenas are less restricted by the fourth amendment requirements of
relevance and probable cause than are judicial subpoenas. The relevance requirement is vio-
lated only if the subpoena is overbroad. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at
651-52 (1950); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). The probable cause requirement is satis-
fied for a production request if the reviewing court determines the investigation is authorized
by Congress, the purpose is one Congress has the power to order, and the requested docu-
ments are relevant to the investigation. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186, 209 (1946).
Furthermore, IRS document requests are employed primarily for civil actions whereas
judicial subpoenas are utilized most often in criminal investigations. In fact, use by the IRS
of an administrative subpoena to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution is improper, see,
e.g., United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973), and courts will invalidate the
subpoena if a criminal investigation is the sole purpose of the subpoena request. See Note, IRS
Access, supra note 4, at 263 n.81 (citing United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir.
1969); Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. O'Connor, 118 F.
Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953)). The Internal Revenue Code does empower the IRS to initiate
criminal actions, I.R.C. § 7302 (empowering the IRS to issue search warrants to obtain evi-
dence relevant to violations of revenue laws). Once the taxpayer is subject to criminal suit,
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customer with certain protections, including notice of the IRS sum-
mons 182 and standing to contest the validity of the summons. 18 3 Con-
gress passed § 1205 to remedy three problems that existed under the
previous Code: the taxpayer's lack of standing to contest summonses
from IRS agents for taxpayer records, IRS control over the issuance of
"John Doe subpoenas,"' 184 and the excessive financial burden on banks
complying with the IRS third party summonses. 185 From the perspec-
tive of the bank depositor, the most serious of the problems was the tax-
payer's lack of standing.
In Donaldson v. United States,' 6 the Supreme Court held that a tax-
payer may not intervene as a matter of right 8 7 in an IRS summons
enforcement proceeding and that he must demonstrate a significantly
protectable interest to intervene.188 In reaction to this decision Congress
however, he is entitled to greater constitutional protection than when under civil investiga-
tion. See United States v. Stamp, 458 F.2d 759, 774-80 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
842 (1972). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (warrant requirements are the same in tax investiga-
tions as they are in general criminal investigations). Thus, protections of the Tax Reform Act
of 1976 were established to remedy invasions of customer privacy originating from improper
use of the administrative subpoena in civil investigations. Since Miller was contesting a
grand jury subpoena seeking evidence for a criminal prosecution, he would have derived little
solace from the civil protections of the Tax Reform Act.
182 Once the IRS summons the third party, it must notify the taxpayer within three days,
and the taxpayer then has two weeks in which to decide whether to allow the third party to
release the records. I.R.C. § 7609.
183 The IRS must seek enforcement of the summons in the district court if the taxpayer
refuses to consent by notifying the third-party recordkeeper in writing and sending a copy to
the IRS, id § 7609(b)(2), and the taxpayer is then granted automatic standing to intervene.
184 A John Doe summons is used by the IRS to obtain records or information without
stating the identity of the person under investigation. In United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S.
141, the Supreme Court upheld the enforceability of the John Doe summons. Section 7609(0
of the Code requires the IRS to obtain judicial approval before issuing a John Doe summons.
See generally Comment, Government Access, supra note 4, at 657; Note, IRSAccess, supra note 4, at
275; Note, IRS Use, supra note 4.
185 See Comment, Government Access, supra note 4, at 653.
186 400 U.S. 517.
187 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize two forms of intervention: intervention
as of right, FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and permissive intervention, FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) permits the intervention as of right "when the applicant
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and
he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede
his ability to protect that interest. . . ." The impact of the Donaldson holding was to deny
taxpayers an absolute intervention right, but it preserved permissive intervention when the
taxpayer could assert a significantly protectable interest. 400 U.S. at 530-3 1. But see United
States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1971) (court relied on Donaldson to reject interven-
tion on discretionary grounds).
188 400 U.S. at 530. The Donaldson Court recognized that proof that an administrative
subpoena was issued with only a criminal investigative purpose will serve as a significant
protectable interest to entitle the taxpayer to intervene. Id at 530. Moreover, a taxpayer
may assert a significantly protectable interest by way of evidentiary privilege or abuse of
process. Id at 531. The Donaldson Court established a strict burden of proof for taxpayers to
meet in asserting protectable interests: "[I]f there is a valid civil purpose for the investigation,
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enacted § 1205, which expressly overrules Donaldson by providing tax-
payers the right to intervene in third party summons proceedings. The
legislative history of § 1205 indicates that it was passed to protect per-
sonal privacy rights against invasion by administrative summonses.189
However, several defects in the statute militate against its use to
protect the bank depositor under criminal investigation. 9 0 The Act
does not specifically prohibit Internal Revenue Service use of informal
access methods to obtain bank records. Thus, a customer will not re-
ceive notice if informal access is allowed by the banking institution.1 9 1
Furthermore, the Tax Reform Act provides no penalties for failure to
notify the customer that a summons has been issued for his bank
records. 192 Finally, while the Tax Reform Act provides additional pro-
tection for taxpayers confronted with civil investigations, the Act's pro-
tections do not extend to criminal actions. Therefore, under the Act, a
depositor is not allowed to contest an invalid subpoena used to obtain
evidence against him for criminal prosecution.
The Act also does not provide protection against grand jury sub-
poenas for depositor records. Thus, if the FBI or the United States At-
torney, and not the IRS, requests the subpoena, then the Tax Reform
Act protections are inapplicable and Miller will deny the depositor
standing to contest the subpoena.
Nevertheless, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 represents a strong con-
gressional effort to revive privacy protections which the Court in Donald-
son refused to acknowledge. If the dual components of the Katz
expectation of privacy test determine the existence of a constitutional
privacy right, then the enactment of the Tax Reform Act supports the
acknowledgement of a fourth amendment depositor privacy interest.
Under the first component of Katz, the Act gives the depositoi certain
actual privacy expectations concerning civil investigations: that he will
the summons will be enforced, even though the pn'may purpose of the investigation is to
uncover evidence for use in criminal prosecution." Comment, 6overnment Access, supra note 4,
at 654 n.124 (citing United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Moore, 485 F.2d 1165, 1167 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Held, 435 F.2d 1361, 1364 (6th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971)). See generaly Note, Special Agent's Admission That
Civil Summons Issued To Augment Prior Criminal Search Warrant Not Probative of Bad Faith, 54 TEx.
L. REv. 1147 (1976).
189 S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 368 (1976).
190 See Comment, Government Access, supra note 4, at 656-57.
191 The RFPA will not aid the taxpayer either, for the RFPA provisions do not apply to
"the disclosure of financial records in accordance with the procedures authorized by the In-
ternal Revenue Code." 12 U.S.C. § 3413(c) (Supp. III 1976). The existence of this loophole
underscores the conclusion that only a constitutionally rooted privacy interest can adequately
safeguard customer financial records.
192 Comment, Government Access, supra note 4, at 657. The author recommends that the
exclusionary rule apply to records obtained without compliance with the notice requirements
and therefore such evidence received not be allowed into evidence at trial. Id at 657 n. 144.
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be notified of IRS requests by administrative subpoenas for his bank
records, that he can order the bank not to release the desired documents,
and that he may intervene in court as a matter of right to establish why
the IRS request should be denied. Under the second component of the
Katz test, the passage of the Tax Reform Act demonstrates that society
values depositor privacy rights and is sufficiently concerned about pri-
vacy incursions to statutorily protect such depositor privacy rights.
STATE PRIVACY LEGISLATION
Not only has society expressed its desire to protect depositor privacy
interests through federal legislation, but through the enactment of state
depositor privacy legislation, society has reiterated that depositors pos-
sess a constitutionally protected fourth amendment privacy interest.
The most comprehensive state attempt to accommodate customer pri-
vacy expectations and law enforcement requirements is the California
Right to Financial Privacy Act. 193 The Act acknowledges the confiden-
tial banker-customer relationship, confirms that this relationship should
statutorily be protected, and recognizes that a balancing test must be
employed to reconcile customer and law enforcement interests.
The Act provides that no state or local officers may obtain copies
of, or the information contained in, the customer's financial records1 94
unless they are particularly described, realistically within the scope of
the investigation, and requested by acceptable means. 195 Customer con-
sent to disclosure must be in writing. 96 If the requesting officer utilizes
an administrative subpoena or summons, the officer must serve a copy
on the bank customer.' 97 Agencies' 98 and grand juries' 99 can also em-
193 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 7460-90 (West Supp. 1979). See general Bloom, Bank Records and
the Right to An'vaq, 52 CAL. ST. BJ. 198 (1977).
194 The Act defines customer financial records as "any original or any copy of any record
or document held by a financial institution pertaining to a customer of the financial institu-
tion." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7465(b) (West Supp. 1979).
195 Id § 7470(a). The requesting officer may employ such means as customer consent, an
administrative subpoena or summons, a search warrant, a judicial subpoena, or a subpoena
duces tecum. Id § 7470(a)(1)-(3).
196 The disclosure authorization must be for a certain time period, must name the depart-
ment seeking the information and the purpose for which the information is sohght, and must
identify the requested documents. The written authorization must also make clear to the
customer that his authorization is revocable at any time. Id. § 7473(c).
197 Id § 7473. The requesting agency must then wait ten days. If the customer does not
inform the banking institution of his intention to quash the subpoena within this ten-day
period, the agency then may, obtain access to these records. Search warrants are treated
somewhat differently in that the officer or agency may examine the customer's financial
records once the warrant has been served on the financial institution. Id § 7474(a)(1).
198 The customer first must be notified of the agency access request. Id § 7475. However,
nothing in this or other sections shall preclude the financial institution from giving the cus-
tomer notice of the warrant's request. Id
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ploy judicial subpoenas or subpoenas duces tecum to obtain customer
financial records. The law makes violation of the Act a misdemeanor,20 0
authorizes injunctive relief,20' and awards reasonable attorney's fees if
the customer's challenge is successful.2 02
Illinois also has passed a statute that seeks to promote bank-cus-
tomer confidentiality. 20 3 The statute prohibits a state bank from disclos-
ing, except to the customer, any of the customer's financial records20 4
unless requested through use of a lawful subpoena, warrant, or court
order.2 0 5 These access requests must be served both on the bank and the
customer, although the court may waive service upon the customer for
good cause.20 6
Maryland too has enacted a statute protecting bank depositor pri-
vacy. The Maryland law20 7 prohibits the financial institution from re-
leasing a customer's records to anyone other than the customer, absent
both customer authorization and a valid request through lawful sub-
poena, summons, warrant, or court order.20 8 Such requests must be
served both on the customer and the financial institution.20 9 Violation
of the statute, either by officers attempting to gain access to records
without a judicial access order or by employees or officers of the
financial institution who release such information illegally, can result in
a misdemeanor conviction and a fine.210  The Maryland statute is
unique in that it includes a preamble stating the public policy goal of
protecting confidentiality while facilitating commercial transactions.2 1'
199 Section 7476(b)(1) requires a majority of the grand jury to demonstrate "to a judge of
the superior court that there exists a reasonable inference that a crime within the jurisdiction
of the grand jury has been committed and that the financial records sought are reasonably
necessary to the jury's investigation of that crime. .... "
200 Id § 7485.
201 Id § 7487.
202 Id § 7486.
203 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16 1/2, § 148.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
204 Id § 148.1(c).
205 Id § 148.1(d)(1).
206 Id
207 MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN. § 1-802 (1980).
208 Id
209 Id § 1-304. For good cause, the court may waive service of the subpoena, summons,
warrant, or court order on the customer. Id
210 Id § 1-305.
211 In 1976, the General Assembly of Maryland in a preamble to the Confidential Finan-
cial Record statute declared:
(1) Procedures and policies governing the relationship between fiduciary institu-
tions and government agencies have in some cases developed without due regard to the
constitutional rights of customers of those institutions; and
(2) The confidential relationships between fiduciary institutions and their custom-
ers must be preserved and protected.
(b) It is the purpose of this act to protect and preserve the confidential relationship
between fiduciary institutions and their customers and to promote commerce by pre-
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While California, Illinois, and Maryland statutes offer concrete,
substantial protection for bank depositors, the statutes acknowledge ac-
tual customer privacy expectations in bank records. All three statutes
specify the legal means available to law enforcement agents to secure
customer records. The statutes require that government officials notify
the customer of the access request and the California statute grants the
customer standing to contest the validity of the government's access re-
quest. Therefore, under California law, a bank depositor could block an
access request if a legally defective subpoena had been issued, and under
Illinois and Maryland law, the bank could be fined up to $1,000 for
unauthorized disclosure of records.
These protections afford a bank depositor in California, Illinois,
and Maryland an actual expectation that his bank records will not be
viewed by government officials without notice and a reasonable oppor-
tunity to contest the request. Under the actual expectation requirement
of the Katz test, bank depositors qualify for fourth amendment protec-
tion. Depositors also can assert that these statutes represent society's rec-
ognition that customer privacy protections are reasonable. Thus, the
legislative judgments of these three states satisfy Katz and entitle bank
depositors to the full protections of the fourth amendment.
THE WHITE REASONABLE EXPECTATION BALANCING TEST
While the decisions of courts and the pronouncements of legisla-
tures can indicate the reasonableness of privacy expectations, Justice
Harlan in United States v. White articulated a balancing test for determin-
ing whether the challenged search invaded an interest that society has
concluded is reasonably protected. He suggested that the nature of the
particular police practice and its probable impact on an individual's
sense of security be balanced against the utility of the practice as a law
enforcement technique.2 12 Applying this balancing test to the banking
context, the depositor's rights should prevail. In banking, the particular
police practice is an informal request for all documents pertaining to a
depositor's account. The informal request is broad in scope and is cir-
cumscribed by a judicial determination that the government has cause
to request material documents.
In addition to having unlimited scope, informal and unrestricted
government access to a depositor's bank records has a debilitating and
demonstrable effect on personal security. Most depositors believe their
scribing policies and procedures applicable to the disclosure of customer records by
fiduciary institutions.




relationships with their bank to be confidential, 13 yet this belief is
shaken when customers learn of incidents in which records are divulged
without depositor authorization. The bank's unauthorized disclosure of
information makes customers aware of the paucity of legal rights in this
area and also injects distrust and fear into subsequent banker-customer
relations.
Under Justice Harlan's balancing test, this unrestricted and infor-
mal police access to customer records and its consequent debilitating
effect on banker-customer relations must be weighed against the utility
of informal access requests. Government use of bank records in civil and
criminal cases is a common practice which has facilitated investigations
and prosecutions. 214 Analogously, informal access to citizens' homes
might also facilitate police investigatory goals. Yet policemen cannot
obtain such information without a showing of probable cause to obtain
a search warrant.215
Prosecutorial convenience often must give way to superior privacy
rights. Probable cause is not an insurmountable standard for law en-
forcement officers to attain. By imposing such a standard, officers
would be forced only to pursue bank records in cases in which the likeli-
hood of record relevance was high. This protection would therefore re-
duce the incidence of bank record inspections and of unrestricted
invasions of personal transactions. Subpoenas based on probable cause
would allow law enforcement officers to gain access to customer records
under proper circumstances, but would also protect customer privacy
and promote bank-customer trust. Therefore, informal government ac-
cess to customer records cannot be justified under Justice Harlan's bal-
ancing test.
STATE JUDICIAL CREATION OF PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS
Evidence of society's willingness to protect depositor privacy rights
appears in more than federal and state statutes. In recent years, state
213 "It is hornbook law that bank customers may expect their banks to treat their financial
affairs as confidential." Brief for Petitioner at 6, United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (citing
10 AM. JUR. 2d Banks § 332):
[I]t is an implied term of the contract between a banker and his customer that the banker
will not divulge to third persons without the consent of the customer, express or implied,
either the state of the customer's account or any of his transactions with the bank, or any
information relating to the customer acquired through the keeping of his account, unless
the banker is compelled to do so by court order, the circumstances give rise to a public
duty of disclosure, or the protection of the banker's own interests requires it.
Id
214 12 U.S.C. § 1826(a)(1).
215 Furthermore, when a citizen puts something in his filing cabinet, desk drawer, or in his
pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable search and seizure.
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. at 301.
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courts have increasingly interpreted their state constitutions to accord
greater constitutional protections to their citizens than provided by the
Federal Constitution as construed by the Supreme Court.216 One Jus-
tice has applauded this trend:
State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections
often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to
the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of
state law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be
guaranteed. 217
He has suggested that the impetus for the expansion of state constitu-
tional protection derives from state court disagreement with Supreme
Court analyses and direction.218
State courts have been exceedingly active in interpreting their state
constitutions as providing greater privacy protection than that accorded
to depositors by the Miller court.219 One state exhibiting judicial inde-
pendence in this area is Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth v. DeJohn,220 the
highest court in Pennsylvania expressly rejected United States v. Miller.
In Dejohn, the defendant was convicted of murdering her husband. She
objected to the introduction into evidence of her bank records which
helped establish the motive.22' While admitting that the subpoenas
216 Falk, The Supreme Court of California 1971-1972, Foreword- The State Constitutiorn A More
than 'Adequate'Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (1973); Howard, State Courts and Consti-
tutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Wilkes, More on the New
Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J. 873 (1975); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421,437-43 (1974); Project Report,
Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 271 (1973).
217 Brennan, supra note 4, at 491.
218 Justice Brennan has isolated this cause of the burgeoning state courts' expansive view of
the applicability of state rights:
It may not be wide of the mark, however, to suppose that these state courts discern, and
disagree with, a trend in recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court to pull
back from, or at least suspend for the time being, the enforcement of the Boyd principle
with respect to application of the federal Bill of Rights and the restraints of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Id at 495.
219 Ten states explicitly mention a right to privacy in their state constitutions. See ALASKA
CONST. art. 1, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 12; HAWAII CONsT. art. 1, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5; MONT.
CONsT. art. 2, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
Most states recognize a right to privacy that derives from common law, however, three
states have expressly refused to acknowledge such a common law right. See Brunson v. Ranks
Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955); Henry v. Cherry, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97
(1909); Milner v. Red River Valley Publishing Co., 249 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. 1952). For a gener-
ally comprehensive treatment of privacy statutes, see R. SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND
FEDERAL PRIVACY LAws (1978-79). The above constitutional provisions provide further evi-
dence that constituents hold, and are entitled to maintain, genuine expectations of privacy.
220 486 Pa. 32, 44, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 709 (1980).
221 The defendant managed the family finances, and had missed the two most recent mort-
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were unlawful, the prosecution urged the court to adopt the Miller ra-
tionale and find that the defendant had no standing to contest the sub-
poenas.
The court rejected this argument, responding: "As we believe that
Miller establishes a dangerous precedent, with great potential for abuse,
we decline to follow that case when construing the state constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. '222 The court
recognized the established right of state courts to augment federal con-
stitutional rights through use of analogous state constitutional provisions
and adopted the reasoning of Burrows as "recognizing modern electronic
realities [and as] more persuasive than the simplistic proprietary analy-
sis, supposedly rejected in Katz v. United States,. .. used by the court in
Ailler." 223
California has also relied upon its state constitution to confer upon
depositors greater privacy protection than that afforded under the Fed-
eral Constitution. In Burrows v. Superior Court, the court held that "Peti-
tioner had a reasonable expectation that the bank would maintain the
confidentiality of those papers which originated with him in check form
and of the bank statements into which a record of those same checks had
been transformed pursuant to internal banking practice. '224
Justice Brennan adopted the Burrows decision in his dissent in
United States v. Miller.225 He compared the relevant portion of the Con-
stitution226 with the nearly identical provision in the California Consti-
tution 227 and concluded that the language in each created identical
rights. He then asserted that the California Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the relevant constitutional language was correct and should be
gage payments. Furthermore, she had signed her husband's name to a loan application to
obtain money for paying back a personal loan. Her husband was insured for over $200,000
and she was the primary beneficiary. Id at 1285.
222 Id at 44, 407 A.2d at 1289.
223 Id at 47, 407 A.2d at 1290.
224 13 Cal. 3d at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169. Several state courts have
either approved or adopted the Burrows reasoning. In a concurring opinion, Judge Abraham-
son of the Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed with the Burrows reasoning and argued that
"each person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her bank statement and records
which is protected under. . . the Wisconsin Constitution." State v. Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 399,
421, 280 N.W.2d 739, 751 (1978). The Miller rule was specifically rejected by the Colorado
Supreme Court in Charnes v. Digiacomo, 612 P.2d 1117 (Colo. 1980). In Charnes, the court
held that a taxpayer possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bank records and
therefore could challenge the government's subpoena for the records directed at the bank. Id
at 1120.
225 425 U.S. at 447 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
226 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
227 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,




The Miller majority distinguished the California Supreme Court's
analysis by noting that in Burrows, no legal process229 had been invoked
to obtain the records whereas in Miller, the Treasury Department agents
had employed a subpoena duces tecum. 230 As Justice Brennan correctly
observed, 23t however, the majority held that the defendant's lack of
standing was not dependent upon the validity of the subpoena duces
tecum. 232 Therefore, apparently the absence of legal process is irrele-
vant and Miller, under the majority's view, would not have possessed a
privacy interest even if the agents had informally requested the docu-
ments. Recognizing the majority's inconsistent logic, Justice Brennan
admonished future counsel to assert state as well as federal privacy
rights for their clients to minimize the impact of the current Supreme
228 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 448 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
229 The proper definition of legal process has been debated under California law. Seegener-
ally Bloom, supra note 193. While a search warrant would satisfy the standard, subpoenas
arguably might not. However, in Carlson v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 3d 13, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 850 (1976), the California court decided subpoenas were adequate legal process. The
defendants in Carlson allegedly used false pretenses to illegally obtain an older woman's
finances. During the investigation, a district attorney obtained two subpoenas duces tecum
for the defendant's bank records. The trial court held the records were obtained with legal
process. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that a subpoena duces tecum satisfying statu-
tory requirements constitutes sufficient legal process to empower prosecutors to obtain de-
fendant bank records in criminal proceedings.
Curiously the Carlson court held that for a subpoena duces tecum to be consistent with
legal process, it must satisfy an unusually high standard:
It follows that law enforcement officials may not gain access to an accused's private
papers by subpoena until there has been a judicial determination there is probable cause
to believe he has committed a criminal offense and that the papers and documents de-
scribed in the subpoena would be material evidence in the case. Such determinations are
not and cannot be made by the clerk who issues the subpoena and may not be made by
the prosecutor himself.
Id. at 22, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 855. Previous California and federal cases had not imposed such a
stringent requirement covering the issuance of subpoena duces tecum. See United States v.
Gross, 416 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1013 (1970); Harris v. United
States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969); Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617 (10th Cir.
1968); Southern Pac. Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 206, 210, 100 P.2d 302, 304 (1940).
The Supreme Court in Miller reached the opposite conclusion in stating that subpoenas
duces tecum are not subject to the higher probable cause standard: "A subpoena duces recum
issued to obtain records is subject to no more stringent Fourth Amendment requirements than
is the ordinary subpoena. A search warrant, in contrast, is issuable only pursuant to prior
judicial approval and authorizes Government officers to seize evidence without requiring en-
forcement through the courts." United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 446 n.8 (citing United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1973)). However, the California Supreme Court denied a
hearing in Carson, so currently a subpoena duces tecum must be issued upon a showing of
probable cause before government agents can obtain customer bank records in California. 58
Cal. App. 3d 13, 129 Cal. Rptr. 850.
230 425 U.S. at 445 n.7.
231 Id at 448 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
232 Id at 441 n.2 (majority opinion).
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Court's restrictive interpretation of fourth amendment protections.2 33
While several states have adopted the Miller rationale,234 the im-
port of the California and Pennsylvania decisions remains clear. On a
basic level, these two states have declared that their residents under
their state constitutions possess legitimate expectations of privacy in
their bank records. Thus, these states have accorded their citizens
greater protection against privacy invasion than that presently accorded
under the Federal Constitution.
But these state decisions represent more than just increased deposi-
tor protection under state constitutions. The judicial expressions of the
California and Pennsylvania courts evidence society's willingness to ac-
cord bank depositors privacy protection. They contradict the Supreme
Court's conclusion in Miller that depositors lack standing and suggest
that Miller's conclusion is now erroneous. These cases further suggest
that under the Katz expectation of privacy test, depositors warrant
fourth amendment privacy protection under the Federal Constitution.
Under the first component of the Katz test which requires that the de-
fendant possess an actual expectation of privacy, bank depositors in Cal-
ifornia and Pennsylvania can point to their state judicial
233 Id at 454-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing as examples of the Court's restrictive
stance, Doe v. Commonwealth's Atty., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238
(1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)).
234 Six states have adopted the position of the Miller Court. See Cox v. State, 392 N.E.2d
496 (Ind. App. 1979); State v. Fredette, 411 A.2d 65 (Me. 1979); State v. Sheetz, 265 S.E.2d
914, 919 n.2 (N.C. App. 1980); Nichols v. Council on Judicial' Complaints, 615 P.2d 280
(Okla. 1980). Peters v. Sjoholm, 25 Wash. App. 39, 604 P.2d 527 (1979); Fitzgerald v. State,
599 P.2d 572 (Wyo. 1979).
Connecticut has also followed Miller's lead in denying a depositor standing to appear
and contest the legal sufficiency of a subpoena duces tecum. CONN. L.J., vol. 41, no. 12
(1979). In In re State's Attorne,, a Connecticut bank representative was subpoenaed to testify in
Illinois and to produce the cancelled checks of the defendant. As required by the Connecticut
statute, the defendant received a copy of the subpoena, but was not notified of the date of the
hearing. The majority cited Miller as controlling and denied the defendant's request for a
hearifig. As stated by a concurring judge, however, the court illogically refused to infer a
right to a hearing from the statute which provided the bank customer with notice. Since
notice and the right to a hearing are the most fundamental due process safeguards, it seems
unlikely that legislators would have written one safeguard into the statute while purposely
deleting the other. Indeed, several statutes providing for customer notice also confer standing
upon bank customers to contest the validity of the governmental search requests. See notes
193-211 & accompanying text supra.
More importantly, these cases suffer from a fundamental flaw. Each court blindly ad-
hered to the Miller result without examining its analysis. Thus, these cases are subject to the
same analytical criticisms that have been leveled at Miller over the last five years. See notes
27-151 & accompanying text supra. Thus, while these cases appear to evidence societal un-
willingness to recognize depositor privacy expectations as reasonable, their reliance on Miller
and its inadequate analysis of the privacy issue militates against the conclusion that these
cases represent anything more than the application of stare decisis.
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pronouncements as giving them concrete rights and actual privacy ex-
pectations.
Bank depositors can also utilize these decisions to satisfy the second
Katz component which requires that a defendant's expectations be ones
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Clearly, California
and Pennsylvania have adjudged a depositor privacy expectation as rea-
sonable. Federal and state privacy statutes provide further evidence
that depositors today possess actual expectations of privacy which soci-
ety has determined are reasonable. The Supreme Court should reevalu-
ate its decision in United States v. Miller in light of these changed.
expectations.
CONCLUSION
In the last five years, courts and legislatures have generated diver-
gent responses to the bank-customer privacy issue. Ironically, our na-
tion's court of last resort, the ultimate arbiter of our nation's legal issues,
caused this varying state of affairs by its decision in UnitedSates v. Miller.
Criticism of the Court's decision arose quickly and stridently. Congress
reacted by enacting the Right to Financial Privacy Act conferring statu-
tory privacy protection on bank customers and provided additional cus-
tomer protection in the Tax Reform Act of 1976. States such as
California, Maryland, and Illinois similarly enacted statutes creating
customer protections in their transactions with state banking institu-
tions. Finally, several state supreme courts have interpreted their state
constitutions as providing greater constitutional customer protection
than offered by the United States Constitution as interpreted by the
Miller Court.
Thus, customers today can legitimately claim expectations of pri-
vacy in their bank records on the basis of federal law, state law, and
state constitutional grounds. If Justice Harlan's expectation of privacy
test in Katz v. United States is to remain viable, then the Supreme Court
must be cognizant of the societal changes occurring since Miller, and
realize that bank customers today "have exhibited an actual subjective
expectation of privacy" and that bank customers' privacy expectations
are "one[s] that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ",235
Our Constitution is not a static, inflexible document and often re-
sponds to significant societal changes. 236 The Miller decision should be
reconsidered in light of its statutory and judicial progeny. Additionally,
235 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
236 Compare Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
(women's rights). Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), with Brown v. Board of
Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (racial equality).
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states should continue to augment bank customer rights both through
judicial decisions and statutory enactments. State courts should evalu-
ate Miller on its own merits: "[O]pinions of the United States Supreme
Court are like opinions of sister state courts or lower federal courts.
While neither binding in a constitutional sense nor precedential in a
jurisprudential one, they are entitled to whatever weight their reasoning
and intellectual persuasiveness warrant." 23 7
Our federal governmental structure must accommodate the ten-
sions resulting from conflicting state and federal decisions. The system
is viable because divergent views are accommodated. A bank customer
today entertains actual expectations of bank record privacy and state
constitutions should be used to demonstrate such expectations are ones
society deems deserving of protection.2 38
JOSEPH R. MANGAN, JR.
237 Falk, supra note 216, at 283-84.
238 Federalism need not be a mean-spirited doctrine that serves only to limit the scope of
human liberty. Rather, it must necessarily be furthered significantly when state courts thrust
themselves into a position of prominence in the struggle to protect the people of our nation
from governmental intrusions on their freedoms. Brennan, sufira note 4, at 503.
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